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NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

USE OF ARAB ECONOMIC AID TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic No 1825, 26 Mar 82 p 41

[Editorial by 'Adnan Karimah: "Why Don't the Arabs Learn From...America?"]

[Text] Seven of the 25 Arab states were chosen by the International Monetary Fund [IMF] to assist it in supplying funds needed to aid the developing countries in developing their economies on the basis of its budget for the 1982-1983 fiscal year.

The President of the IMF Clausen had previously warned that the poorer countries will suffer privation unless they receive more material aid through developing the skills of their citizens and by expanding the production of goods or developing basic industries in their countries. And when the year 1990 arrives, there will be 100 million persons living in degrading poverty.

The IMF experts chose the 7 Arab countries to use their surplus currencies to finance its operations because their economies are considered the strongest in the world. These countries are Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the Emirates, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, and Algeria.

Some observations on this choice are in order.

(1) It is doubtedless testimony to the esteem in which the IMF holds these countries because of the soundness of their economic performance and strength of their national economies. It is something to be thankful for, at least from the standpoint of international exposure.

(2) It appears that the IMF experts' studies on the economies of the 7 Arab countries before they were chosen were based on pre-1981 statistics. Most are estimates and they do not take into account the developments that have taken place in the international oil market and what might happen in 1982-1983. They indicate, according to the expectations of the foreign experts led by Americans, that there will be a decline in prices or in production. In either case, the surplus currencies of the producing countries will inevitably decrease below the earlier estimates of the experts on whom the IMF relies.

Based on a report published in the American PETROLEUM INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY, the oil states have been nominated for an unenviable position because of the financial pressures to which they will be subjected if the production and price problems persist.

Only 3 Arab states possess sufficient capacity to lower production without causing a budgetary deficit, namely:

Saudi Arabia. Its financial reserves are estimated at \$161.6 billion. It now produces 7.5 million barrels a day at a time when its current balance of accounts requires the production of only 6.4 million barrels.

United Arab Emirates. Their financial reserves are estimated at \$38.6 billion. They now produce about 1.4 million barrels and their current balance of accounts requires the production of only 810,000 barrels.

Qatar. Its financial reserves are estimated at \$16.1 billion. It now produces about 360,000 barrels a day at a time when its current balance of accounts requires the production of only 60,000 barrels.

As for the other Arab oil states, they are in an unenviable position at present. Perhaps Kuwait is best off because of its large financial reserves estimated at \$76.2 billion. However, it now produces about 700,000 barrels a day while its current balance of accounts requires the production of 900,000 barrels since it is sometimes compelled because of the pressure of surplus oil to reduce its production below that level.

Algeria. It is among the 7 Arab countries chosen by the IMF to use its surplus currency to finance the Fund's operations and help the poor states. It is clear that it is among the most indebted of Arab states to the international financial markets. Its financial reserves are estimated at only \$3.8 billion. It now produces about 700,000 barrels while its current balance of accounts requires the production of 1.2 million barrels.

(3) The reduction of the United States' share, or failure to increase it, in the IMF budget, not to mention other international institutions, has made it more necessary for the Fund to borrow from countries with surplus financial reserves. Does this mean it is up to the Arab oil-producing countries to cover the shortfall of the Reagan government in assisting the developing countries through international institutions?

If the American government prefers bilateral aid, which it subjects to a thousand considerations...and considerations according to the requirements of its military, political, and economic interests, why don't the Arab states learn from it to concentrate their bilateral aid to developing countries also according to the requirements of their national interests.

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

RESULTS OF ENERGY CONFERENCE

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABIA WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic No 254, 15-21 Mar 82, p 35

[Article by 'Afif al-Razza]

[Text] "Energy in the service of development and economic integration" is the slogan chosen by the Second Arab Energy Conference that was held last week in Qatar. It was attended by about 400 Arab and foreign experts specializing in the field.

Among those who participated in arranging the Second Energy Conference were the Arab League and the Arab Organization for Industrial Development in addition to the organizers of the first conference, i.e., the Arab Economic and Social Development Fund and OAPEC. Also, the Arab Oil Conference combined with the Arab Energy Conference to unify efforts, reduce duplication, and try to assign responsibility for energy issues to agencies more specialized in this field.

The odd thing is that many words were spoken at the conference concerning the need to search for an energy substitute for the time when Arab oil dries up. Less was said concerning the need to devise a unified Arab energy strategy. Least was said concerning the need to direct the present utilization of energy and halt the present squandering of the reserves and concerning the need to employ them in the service of Arab development now and in the future instead of selling them as raw material and converting them to money that sometimes exceeds the ability to use it.

The talk of placing energy in the service of development and Arab economic integration makes it necessary to ask if real progress has been made in reaching the goal of giving concrete form to this economic integration, which witnessed in recent years a proliferation of interested organizations and a total indifference on the part of the more powerful Arab governments to participate in realizing it.

There is no doubt that the striving for Arab economic integration and comprehensive Arab development demands above all an energy strategy that defines its role in the complicated operation of development and the manner of using the abundance of sources and yields.

But there is nothing today that indicates the Arab World is moving, at least in this stage, toward economic integration. On the contrary, there is a great deal of evidence of the opposite. Therefore, the studies submitted to the Second Arab Energy Conference will continue to form intellectual wealth at the academic level exactly like the studies done by the numerous economic unity councils, which never reached the stage of implementation while awaiting a change in the direction in which the winds are blowing.

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CS0: 4404/391

BAHRAIN

BRIEFS

NEW INVESTMENT PERMITS POSTPONED--Minister of Finance and Economy Ibrahim 'Abd al-Karim confirmed that the Administrative Council of the Bahrain Monetary Fund decided to postpone consideration of the granting of permits to any investment company or new bank in Bahrain until next year. The minister expressed concern over the speculation in shares of local and Gulf companies now taking place in the Bahrain market. He said such speculation will result in large losses for many individuals unfamiliar with the financial and administration situation in these companies. The desire for a quick profit is what is motivating them to engage in these dangerous activities. [Text] [Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 26 Mar 82 p 37]

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DEFENSE MINISTER DISCUSSES POST-WITHDRAWAL MILITARY STRATEGY

Cairo AKHIR SA'AH in Arabic No 2480, 5 May 82 pp 4-7

[Interview with Field Marshal 'Abd al-Halim Abu Ghazala, minister of defense, by Muhammad Wajdi Qindil: "Strategic Look at Security Map Around Us; Peace With Israel Does Not Mean Reducing Armed Forces and Restoration of Sinai Does Not Mean Military Relaxation; What Is Egypt's Responsibility To Guarantee 'Gulf Security;' What Is Behind Intensifying Military Growth of Countries Adjacent to Our Borders; Presence of Egyptian Deterrent Force Is Essential for Egypt's Security; There Is No Animosity Between Us and Soviet Union But Its Movements Are Against Our Interests."]

[Text] After the return of the Sinai and the termination of its long captivity, the situation requires a close strategic look at the horizons of this area, which sits on a volcano, and at the security map around us so that it will be possible to discover the path for Egypt's steps during the phase of real peace. These were the dimensions of the questions that I presented to Field Marshal 'Abd al-Halim Abu Ghazala, the minister of defense, during a long interview in his office at the Ministry of Defense.

The entree to the dialogue was Sinai, its future and the changing view of the Sinai as a strategic depth and not a buffer zone. The view then extended to include stability, balance and the constantly growing military forces in the Middle East, the impact of this growth on Egypt's security, Egypt's responsibility for the area's security and the extent of its responsibility for guaranteeing Gulf security.

Field Marshal Abu Ghazala has said frankly: Peace with Israel does not mean reducing the armed forces and the return of the Sinai does not at all mean military relaxation. On the contrary, the situation requires the presence of an Egyptian deterrent force capable of quick movement in more than one direction.

With the same alert view and strategic foresight, Field Marshal Abu Ghazala has answered questions on the following points:

What is Egypt's position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union in light of the Soviet movements in the area? How far has the program for the advanced armaments acquired by Egypt from the United States and the West gone? What is the truth of the reports about technical flaws in the F-16 aircraft? Does the size of the Egyptian presence in Sinai--Zone A--achieve security for Egypt? Does... and does...?

Field Marshal Abu Ghazala has not left a single point unanswered, and has answered with a broad view of the vast horizon and what is beyond.

Completion of the Israeli withdrawal from the entire Sinai has great and deep implications in the conscience of the Egyptians:

It is the right earned by Egypt in return for the exorbitant price it has paid with the blood of its martyrs and with its sweat and sacrifices.

It means the restoration of a free and united national soil under undiminished Egyptian sovereignty and without the relinquishment of a single inch of land. This withdrawal is the fruit of the alert and wise policy of Egypt, which has learned the lessons of history and has opened its doors to this outcome with the force of war one time and with peace efforts another.

[Question] Now, what does the return of the Sinai after a 15-year occupation mean? What are the responsibilities generated toward the land returned from captivity and the land forgotten for a long time? What does this mean militarily and nationally?

[Answer] The answer was given to me by Field Marshal 'Abd al-Halim Abu Ghazala, minister of defense, with all the strength of his overflowing feelings and his Egyptian militarism:

The return of the entire Sinai represents, in my view, a complete victory for the Egyptian people's will and their struggle to liberate the land. It has been a long and hard trip abounding with dangers and pitfalls and interspersed with the battles of war and peace since 1948. This is why it is our duty to protect every inch of the Sinai with our close scrutiny.

If we examine Egypt's modern history throughout the 19th century and the 20th century, we face an important fact:

From 1882, Egyptian soil was not fully liberated and united until 25 April 1982. This expresses the importance of the situation and the place.

Since the British occupation, i.e., nearly 100 years ago, Egypt has continued to suffer from the shadows of various forms of occupation of parts of its territories.

What is important in the situation are the feelings that surfaced clearly among the Sinai inhabitants on 25 April and the inhabitants' yearning for national sovereignty after 15 years of occupation and captivity, unquestionably a long period.

Their feelings have come as the answer to the allegations that the Sinai is not a part of the valley, that it is always viewed as the first line of defense and that it is the protective shield for Egypt that constantly receives the first shock from the east.

Permit me to say that this is a faulty view that is of utmost danger to the national security because Sinai, with every inch of its soil, is a part of the Egyptian depth and a part of the national security. The Sinai must be always viewed from this perspective and it must be understood that the first line of defense of Egypt is Egypt's eastern borders and not the Sinai. The Sinai must be viewed exactly as if it were Cairo on the borders. Therefore, the view of the Sinai must be different from the traditional view which has prevailed so far. I say: Don't view the Sinai as a buffer zone. This is a grave strategic mistake because there is no buffer zone on the national soil.

Every inch of Egypt's soil has a price and we must defend it. This is the answer to the emotional statements reiterated at times on the other side. For the Sinai, and for the sake of the Palestinian cause, we have sacrificed more than 100,000 martyrs, 100,000 people wounded and 100 billion pounds.

Therefore, I say that the return of the Sinai must be the starting point for a march in all spheres so that we can make up for the years and money we have lost. It is essential that the strategic, military and practical view toward the Sinai be a view of rediscovering and rebuilding it.

The day of 25 April was not the end of the road and is not the end of the important and sensitive aspirations that we cherish. Moreover, it is not the end of the violent conflicts and the heated events surrounding us. However, it can be the focal point for the stability of the area and for keeping it clear of the polarization between the two superpowers.

[Question] What, then, are the dimensions of the broad strategic view of the events around us and what is the extent of the link between Egypt's national security--in the wake of the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai--and the heated conditions prevailing in the area?

[Answer] It is essential to have a general strategic view vis-a-vis what surrounds us so that we know where we stand, in which direction to move and what we want.

If we look at the entire world map, we will find that the world is divided into three spheres: The Eastern bloc under Soviet leadership, the Western sphere under U.S. leadership and the rest of the world in a third sphere on a hot surface.

Within the framework of the first two spheres, we find that the rules of the game and the principles of the balance between the two blocs are well known. It is in the interest of the two superpowers that the balance continue to exist and to be preserved so that the brink of danger is not reached. The proofs of this are the policy of detente and the SALT I and SALT II treaties. It is also in the interest of the two superpowers that the game be played outside their borders and their spheres of influence. We then come to the third sphere, which is the victim of the conflict or the friction on the tangential lines of the first two spheres. This conflict or friction generates the small fires that we see around us in the Middle East, Africa and Latin America.

The rules of the game have not yet been set for these parts of the world, which have not yet reached the point of balance. Thus, these parts have turned into coveted objects of attention of the superpowers, which engage in their conflicts and their strategies in these parts. Egypt is in the center of this dangerous area. Rather, Egypt is in the center of the most dangerous area of all, the Middle East.

There are several initial facts that govern the situation and control the rules of the game:

The first is that oil will continue to be the master of the situation in the foreseeable future and will continue to be the main source of energy, considering that it produces 50 percent of the required energy whereas coal produces 25 percent, gas and other resources 20 percent and nuclear and hydraulic power no more than 5 percent. Thus, oil is still predominant in energy.

Imagine that 60 percent of the world's oil comes from this area that has turned into an area of international conflict, or a hot area.

The second fact is that marine transportation is still the least expensive way to transport oil to the consuming areas. The sea shipping lanes, over which 55 percent of the oil needed for West Europe, Japan and the rest of the world travels, pass through this area. Therefore, any threat to this oil flow will affect and paralyze the Western economy.

The third fact is that there is an unperceptive or narrow local view that believes that the Soviet Union is the biggest oil producer and does not need the area's oil. If we look at the real situation, what do we see?

1. In the 1973-75 period, Soviet oil production dropped to the level where it was three percent below Soviet needs. Consequently, the Soviet Union decided to reduce its oil exports to the Warsaw Pact countries and the signs of an energy crisis emerged in the Soviet Union.

2. In 1980-81, the Soviet Union decided to lower production from 24 million barrels daily to 16 million barrels daily, i.e., by 30 percent. This is a large figure, and it has an appreciable impact on Soviet strategy in the world, particularly in the Middle East.

Thus, the Soviet Union has hopes and aspirations to get a share of the area's oil on terms that suit and satisfy the Soviets. This is why the supreme strategy in Moscow takes into consideration this view of its needs for the immediate future.

3. The biggest producer of conventional weapons is the Soviet Union, which exploits its weapon exports to realize its plan for control and for expanding its sphere of influence, especially in the Third World. Conventional weapons mean "tanks, planes and guns," all of which use oil.

Thus, we find that the Soviet Union benefits twice from keeping the region and instability in the oil area, that it exerts ceaseless efforts to control oil sources in the Gulf and Saudi Arabia in one way or another, that it tries to contain these sources within the "red belt" and that it keeps its eyes on these resources.

This is why the Soviet Union is looking for footholds here and there to establish a belt around the area from the Horn of Africa to Bab el-Mandeb and to Afghanistan. Therefore, we have to believe firmly that the Soviet Union wants a share of this oil in the near future.

The fourth fact is that there is a fearful military imbalance in the area and this imbalance has led to the state of instability that is embodied in the Iraq-Iran war, in the charged tension in South Lebanon and in the preparedness, armed to the teeth, in Libya, Ethiopia and South Yemen.

On the other hand, Egypt wants in the post-Sinai liberation phase to rebuild itself and to tackle its chronic problems. It needs vast investments and has no adequate resources. So what can it depend on?

On foreign loans, grants and aid from the United States and the West in particular, and from the Arabs. Should any difficulties or dangers arise in the flow of oil, they would threaten these countries and their economic interests and this means that we would face a critical dilemma.

Therefore, it is in Egypt's interest for stability and balance to be established in the area and for oil to continue to flow from the area's producing countries to the consuming industrial countries. This is the goal of our interest in Gulf security and in putting an end to the Iraq-Iran war.

[Question] This means that there is a direct foreign influence on the area's stability because of the area's oil wealth and its strategic position and because of the ongoing conflicts within the area and around it. What are the dimensions of Egypt's responsibility?

[Answer] (With his penetrating approach, Field Marshal Abu Ghazala said:) Once again, let us return to the map and give it a comprehensive and concentrated look to see what is around us in the area in which we live, by which we are affected and which we affect. What are the features of the panoramic picture?

The features of the fearful flaw in the military and strategic balance become obvious from the first look.

The important and serious observation insofar as Egypt is concerned is that the military capabilities, particularly in weapons, of all the countries around us are growing constantly and in a manner that affects the balance. Take, for example, Israel, Libya, Ethiopia, South Yemen, Syria and numerous other countries.

This surprising military growth will inevitably affect Egypt's national security in one way or another and must inevitably have an impact on the supreme strategy. When we look around us, we wonder: What should we do?

Therefore, Egypt's national security takes into its account and its evaluation of the situation this military growth and the constant changes in the balance of power, especially since each country in the area has its declared and its concealed goals and plans. We do not take matters offhandedly or superficially.

For example, there are those who ask: Can Libya threaten Egypt's national security?

The answer lies in the presence of this constantly growing military force near the western borders. Doesn't this force affect the balance of power and doesn't it introduce new and changing factors into the outlook and into the dealings? We must take into account the fact that a deterrent force is necessary to protect peace and for good neighborly relations.

By the way, there is an important matter to which we must pay attention.

In any state, if there is a balance between three certain elements, then this country realizes stability in its policy and its actions and is not subjected to internal pressures that motivate it to look around it. These elements are: Manpower, military capability and available resources. If a flaw develops in the balance between these elements, then the state goes beyond its borders, either by war or by peace.

Numerous models of this example are present in the area.

So far, Israel, for example, has not limited the extent of the Jewish immigration flowing into it. Consequently, this leads to the construction of more settlements in the occupied Arab territories. The growing manpower is greater than the available resources. This is why some circles believe that Israel has its goals in the Golan and in the West Bank.

On the other side, we find another example in Libya, which employs the help of foreign military capability because of the unavailability of required manpower. There are 15,000 Cuban, Soviet and East German experts in the [Libyan] armed forces and security and intelligence agencies. This undoubtedly affects the freedom of movement and the tendencies of the military command's decisions. Consequently, Libya constitutes a source of unrest and instability around it.

But Egypt's role and its national security require Egypt to realize and protect stability in the area. This is the basis of the strategy formulated for the post-Sinai restoration period.

From this point, I will embark on an important issue, namely, Gulf security and the extent of its connection with Egypt, especially since there are intricate foreign forces trying to manipulate the area and seeking to

perpetuate the Iraq-Iran war and to expand its scope so that it will enflame the entire Gulf. This foreign intervention, along with what is happening in Lebanon, has come to constitute a full-fledged conspiracy seeking to have political and military chaos prevail in the area.

(Field Marshal 'Abd al-Halim Abu Ghazala added:) There is no doubt that Egypt's security is tied to the Gulf area's security and to the security of the area in which we live.

Gulf security is also tied to the area's security and affects its stability. Any flaw in this stability and balance exposes the entire area, including Egypt, to dangers and upheavals. This makes Egypt's role, its responsibility for the area's security and its connection with Gulf security obvious.

When we speak of Gulf security, and Saudi Arabia is involved as a fundamental party to it, we must take into account the need for the uninterrupted flow of oil from its sources to the West and to the industrial countries. We must also take into account the fact that oil sources, arteries and shipping must not be exposed to any dangers. This is why Egypt is eager to guarantee the security of the Gulf and of the Arab Peninsula.

The Iraq-Iran war, with its ramifications and its intricate developments, is the number one threat to Gulf security and to the stability of the oil sources.

The latest developments in this war have shown that Iran has become a source of danger to Gulf security and that Khomeyni hopes to export the revolution to the Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia.

If we consider several scenarios for the likely outcome of this war, which has turned into a war of attrition for both sides, what do we find?

In case the battles end in favor of Iran, then Khomeyni's ghost will prevail over Iraq and the Gulf.

Should the war of attrition between Iraq and Iran persist in its present forms then it will end up devoiding both countries of their capabilities and their oil resources. The proof of this is the drop in Iran's oil production to one half million barrels daily. The reason is the weapons drain and the war costs, which only achieve the interests of other foreign forces that play behind the scenes, not to mention the benefits reaped from all this by the weapon-producing countries and the goals realized by certain foreign powers.

[Question] (Field Marshal Abu Ghazala said definitely and decisively:) First I would like to stress that there is no direct animosity between us and the Soviet Union.

But with its movements in Africa and in and around the Arab area, there is no doubt that the Soviet Union poses a threat to Egyptian national interests.

Let us ask: Why did the Soviet Union seek to have that treaty concluded between Libya, Ethiopia and Aden--the axis of the belt surrounding the oil sources? Against whom and in whose interest is the treaty?

Naturally, it is not against the United States because the United States is not present in the area. If this is the goal, then why doesn't the Soviet Union go and fight the United States in the Indian Ocean or in the Pacific Ocean and leave the Middle East alone?

If we examine the map of the international military situation, what do we find?

U.S. and Soviet conflicts, fleets, aircraft and armies that need naval bases and oil supplies. This is why their eyes are focused on the Middle East, the key to the sea routes and lanes. The Soviet Union, for example, has bases in Aden and Ethiopia and has a presence in Libya and Syria. But it is still looking for other footholds and it wants to tighten its grip on the area so that it can besiege NATO from the south.

Thus, we live in an area surrounded by spheres of conflict. We must keep our eyes open, pay attention to what is around us, prepare for any surprises and try to ease the tension and extinguish the burning fire in the Gulf.

[Question] So it is necessary to have an advanced and capable Egyptian deterrent force to safeguard the peace and to repel any danger threatening Egypt's security?

[Answer] Indisputably. Rather, it is a must.

[Question] Then this is contrary to what has been reiterated about the inclination to reduce the Egyptian armed forces following the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai and the restoration of the entire Sinai?

[Answer] Of course this is untrue and unthought of. Peace with Israel does not mean reducing the armed forces, because they are always the protective shield. Permit me to cite an example. Wasn't there a peace treaty between Iran and Iraq? When the shah fell, his generals were executed and the Iranian forces disintegrated. Iraq found it the right opportunity to realize its goals in Shatt al-'Arab and in the border areas and dealt the first blow against Iran, exploiting the disintegration of its deterrent power.

What I mean by this is that a deterrent capability enhances the weight of the state. When the military strength of a neighboring country grows and the balance is upset, it becomes easy to embark on any kind of conflict, even over an inch of land or a drop of water. What is happening between Israel and Lebanon is not much different.

Egypt's security cannot be established without being protected by a capable military force, not for aggression but for deterrence and defense, meaning that any side wishing to commit aggression will think twice before embarking on any step if there is a deterrent force facing it on the other side.

Therefore, it is indisputable that the Egyptian military force must grow stronger than it has been, but in an advanced scientific manner.

[Question] What point has been reached in developing the armed forces into a deterrent force so that the balance with the ever-growing military forces around us is maintained?

[Answer] There is a primary fact in the development, namely, that there is no sense in the presence of a large army that is poorly armed and equipped.

It is necessary to take into account development of the quality of the armaments. In training, we have reached a high level of combat capability and technological ability to absorb complex electronic equipment. During the joint maneuvers with the rapid-deployment forces, the Americans expressed their surprise at the capability of our forces. I felt this in my conversations with the U.S. commander. But what do we want beyond this?

The fact is that military development makes it a must for the Egyptian Army to have a shock force, greater firepower and a higher capability for maneuver and mobility. If we attain this level, then we will have reached the degree of modern development, even if the army's manpower drops a little.

This does not mean reducing the number of formations and units but rather enhancing their capabilities and efficiency.

[Question] This means that a certain type of arms is required?

[Answer] True. This is what we demand and what we seek from the weapons-producing world so that we can acquire types of weapons compatible with the capabilities we seek for our forces without, at the same time, exhausting the Egyptian economy.

All this is proceeding hand in hand with the planning for military production so that it will stand on its own feet and meet our needs for certain types of weapons. If we want a strong army, then it is necessary for us to depend on a local military production base capable of supplying the army with equipment. By exporting our production to the world arms market, we can acquire what we need from other sources.

[Question] Good. But as for the U.S. weapons and the deals concluded for tanks, aircraft and other weapons within the framework of the U.S. aid to Egypt--deals amounting this year to \$900 million in loans and \$400 million in military grants--are they enough to meet the needs of the armed forces?

[Answer] Certainly. This arms program drawn up with the United States, and also with France and Britain, will be enough to supply our requirements.

By the end of the 5-year program, we will have developed Egyptian armaments, bringing them as close as possible to the set goal, namely strong army with firepower, capable of rapid movement and maneuverability and possessing "shock" and deterrent force.

[Question] Here the conversation leads us to the F-16 aircraft, the latest in the U.S. arsenal of fighter planes, and to what has been reported in some U.S. papers about technical flaws in this aircraft. Have contacts been made with the U.S. side to examine the matter and to ascertain the safety of these aircraft, which we acquired recently?

[Answer] The truth is that the U.S. side did not notify us officially of the discovery of any certain flaws in the F-16's. All that was available were unofficial reports published in the U.S. press. When we contacted them in Washington, they told us: These are "press reports" and the aircraft sent to Egypt have no flaws.

In my opinion, the issue is greatly exaggerated. Usually, when aircraft shipments--like cars--come out of the factory, minor technical faults are discovered on examination. But they are faults that constitute no danger to the aircraft or to its use.

What I mean is that the flaw may reduce the aircraft's maneuverability somewhat. But it is no dangerous to fly the aircraft and they are now correcting the fault. I would like to stress that we have concluded deals for the latest modified models of the F-16 in its capacity as the most potent and latest fighter plane in the world--a plane that has proven in practice that it is highly capable.

[Question] What about the Soviet weapons that we have. Is there a plan to overhaul the Mig and Sukhoi aircraft and the tanks and guns? How can this be done without the availability of spare parts?

[Answer] Actually, we still have Soviet weapons, a large part of which is still usable. We are overhauling this weaponry and prolonging its hypothetical life span. It will survive in the armed forces for more than 10 years to come when it is overhauled and given the necessary maintenance.

I want to stress that our plan relies on numerous sources of weapons. We have an armaments replacement plan extending to 1990, drawn up according to well-studied steps and without draining the Egyptian economy.

[Question] Let me return to the talk about the position after the final Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai. Does this mean "military relaxation?" Does it mean closing the eyes and ending preparations for any emergency?

[Answer] (Field Marshal Abu Ghazala said in a decisive tone:) No, absolutely not. Withdrawal from the Sinai does not mean that there is "military relaxation" because the balance in the area is still flawed and the threat is still present.

The problem in peace is the necessity of continuing training, of maintaining combat capability and preparing for all eventualities while making sure that the weapons and equipment are constantly renewed and that the military tactics and methods are developed year after year. The external forces surrounding the borders are growing and are developing their weapons constantly. These forces have their goals and their hidden intentions. Therefore, we must understand that there will be no relaxation but rather vigilant readiness.

...so that the phrase "buffer zone" can be dropped from the dictionary?

[Answer] We have drawn up a complete program to achieve this goal. There are plans that are being discussed and that I have presented to the Council of Ministers so that the armed forces can perform their role. There are also military committees discussing the details. The plans projected include the construction of towns for the Egyptian forces present in Zone A of the Sinai in accordance with the peace treaty instead of letting these forces live in tents and trenches in the open. We will thus contribute to developing the Sinai desert. Even insofar as the border forces present in Zone B are concerned, we will build for them small villages to provide them with housing.

[Question] There is a point regarding the Egyptian military presence in the area that needs clarification. Some of those who reject the peace propagate falsely that the Sinai is demilitarized, even though there are 22,000 troops with their tanks and guns in the strategic Zone A?

[Answer] If we say, according to this faulty view, that the Sinai is demilitarized, then we must say that the Negev area in Israel is demilitarized and that the entire northern part of the Saudi desert is demilitarized. The examples are numerous.

I want to ask: Does the absence of deployed forces in any area mean that such an area is demilitarized area? From a modern strategic angle, I find that the volume of the Egyptian forces present in the Sinai, in accordance with the treaty, is fully adequate to achieve Egypt's security. It is no secret that there has never been more than an Egyptian division in the Sinai. I remember that when I was in al-'Arish in the 1950's--1949-55--there was only one division in the entire Sinai at the peak of the confrontation with Israel.

Even in 1967, prior to the amassing of the Egyptian forces in June, all the forces present in the Sinai consisted of three Egyptian brigades.

(He concluded with a fundamental and clear point:) The weight of the Egyptian forces present in the Sinai secures its territories and gives it the necessary protection.

With this fact, which exposes all of the falsehood, the broad strategic look at the horizon reaches its end and encompasses the dimensions of the situation after the return of the Sinai.

8494

CSO: 4504/303

EFFORTS TO REDEVELOP SINAI EXPLORED

Cairo AKHBAR AL-YAWM in Arabic 5 Jun 82 p 5

/Article by Fathi Salim: "AKHBAR AL-YAWM's Investigation into Sinai: The People Changing the Shape of Life on the Valley of the Moon!"/

/Text/ This trip starts in al-Qulali, ends in Taba and is 750 kilometers long and 4 days and nights wide. In the course of it we live with the soldiers of redevelopment, who have started to change the face of life of the settled and desert areas south of the Valley of the Moon, Sinn, from which Sinai derived its name thousands of years ago when the people there worshipped the moon.

At the outset, I reserved a place on an airplane going to the Saint Catherine area and Wadi al-Rahah, to start my mission there.

The first surprise was that the price of the ticket, one way only, was 51 pounds, whereas the price of an airplane ticket from Cairo to Aswan is 80 pounds round trip. I discovered that the announcement the minister of tourism made on a 40 percent reduction in airplane ticket prices to Sinai, as a necessary step to contribute to Sinai's redevelopment, is still just a thought and a hope!

The second surprise came the night of the trip, when the Sinai Airline Company, which Egypt Air recently established, informed me that the flight had been cancelled because of the small number of passengers who had made reservations on it, making it a money-losing flight, and that the next flight in 2 days' time was not assured!

Therefore I had to hasten to the first bus.

From al-Qulali Station in Ramsis Square three routes go to Sinai--three air conditioned buses go to Saint Catherine each week, for 6 pounds 50 piasters a ticket, and three other air conditioned buses at the same fare go to Sharm al-Shaykh, while there are two trips a day to al-'Arish by first class (4 pounds 50 piasters) and ordinary class (2 pounds 25 piasters).

The bus, which was full of white collar employees and laborers going to work in Sinai for the first time, or returning to it from vacation, set out from al-Qulali

for Sharm al-Shaykh at 0700 hours in the morning, covering 500 kilometers in 10 hours. If to that we add the 250 kilometers from Sharm al-Shaykh at the far south of the Gulf of al-'Aqabah to Taba at the far north, along our border with Israel, the distance from Cairo to Taba would be 750 kilometers.

After we had covered 130 kilometers of the Cairo-Suez Road, we reached the entrance to the Martyred Ahmad Badawi Tunnel and went through that, under the waters of the Suez Canal, to Sinai. We had to wait for half an hour as part of the convoy of vehicles that had come before and after us; the tunnel is now operating during two periods only, from 0900 to 1000 hours in the morning and from 1400 to 1500 hours in the afternoon.

I asked the tunnel supervisors why it did not operate all the time and they said that the tunnel was still going through a stage of final testing of fitness for all conditions. The electric power now available to illuminate it and ventilate it was also inadequate. They were waiting for the arrival of two transformers for which a foreign purchase contract had been reached in order to raise the electric power to the desired level and thus operate the tunnel over a 24-hour period, with no cars stopping at its eastern or western entrances. The travel and redevelopment activity which certainly will double in the next few months does not let up.

After the supervisors had made sure that there were fire extinguishers in every vehicle as an insurance against emergencies, that exhaust which spoiled the composition of the air in the tunnel was not coming out of them, and that the vehicles were not carrying flammable materials, the moment to cross arrived. The fire truck preceded us and the phalanx got in movement slowly on a descending route, with 20 meters between cars and another fire truck at the end of the phalanx.

After 2 kilometers we reached a point 50 meters below ground level, where the tremendous, splendid two-way concrete tube below the canal floor starts. The actual body of the tunnel under the water of the canal is 1.5 kilometers long. The tunnel, which cost 105 million pounds, is well lit and brilliant, to the point where you feel like lying out on its floor and not emerging from its depths. You are not aware of the water splashing above you or of the vessels cruising with their tremendous weight over your head. Rather, you just feel pride and glory over this accomplishment which your country has made.

When the body of the tunnel ends, the road up begins; this is another 2 kilometers long; we then reach ground level in Sinai, and the phalanx of vehicles standing in wait on the east to cross to the west starts to move.

To leave the estuary, that is, the eastern shore of the canal, across from Suez, and head for southern Sinai; to our right is the east coast of the Gulf of Suez, which sometimes comes close enough so that we can see it and at other times draws away and disappears from our sight. On our left are the watercourses and mountains of Sinai.

The paved road we are passing over is in severe need of repaving in many sections. In fact, the Road Department of Arab Contractors is paving the first segment of it, while the Department of Roads has started to determine other segments up to

Sharm al-Shaykh for assignment to other companies. However, the important thing is that that takes a long time, because there can be no redevelopment without a system of sound roads.

Sixty-five kilometers beyond the estuary, we reach the first town in South Sinai Governorate, Ra's Sudr. It is a very modest town, like all the towns of southern Sinai, none of which is more than a little village in shape or size. There is an old oilfield in Sudr. Its problem, as Jalilah Jum'ah, a People's Assembly member from South Sinai told me, is the lack of drinking water. The same problem is to be found in the town that comes 70 kilometers after that, Abu Zanimah, as I heard from its mayor, Munir Ahmad Badawi, who came there recently from al-Saba' Lake. The two towns get a small amount of water from tank trucks that bring it in from the closest wells and distribute it to barrels before the houses. The wells are far away and the tankers' capacity is small. The number of white collar workers and laborers engaged in the redevelopment of Sinai is increasing, and 5 months ago a plant to desalinate the water of the Gulf was constructed at Sudr to supply the two towns. However, it functioned for only 2 days, then shut down because the necessary technical labor to operate it was not available.

Technical labor is the most important problem facing all the towns in Sinai. Most of the inhabitants are bedouins and no craftsmen in any occupation are available. Even a person who has to have his shoes repaired, for instance, must go to Suez, so what can one say about plumbers, carpenters or mechanics, who could be paid in gold if they moved to Sinai?

As a result of the scarcity or lack of craftsmen in Sinai, the semiautomated bakery that was recently installed in the town of al-Tur, the capital of South Sinai, is not operating. The same obstacle faces the installation and operation of a number of other semiautomated bakeries the governorate has contracted to buy and apportion among the remaining towns. The cost of a bakery is 16,000 pounds and it produces 3,000 bread-discs per hour. But where are the workers?

As a result a severe shortage appeared in bread following the withdrawal and the arrival of thousands of policemen and civilian workers, especially in al-Tur and Sharm al-Shaykh. The only ordinary bakery in al-Tur, which supplies the two towns, operates continuously but does not meet requirements. The owner of the bakery is offering a wage of 7 to 10 pounds a day to bakers who are willing to move from the Nile Valley to work with him. The governorate, for its part, sent a number of policemen to Cairo to be trained to operate the semiautomated bakeries and declared its enthusiasm and receptivity for any "government" or "P.S." /private sector/ tradesman moving to work there. Government tradesmen can triple their incomes with the allowances and bonuses workers receive in Sinai, in addition to the private income they make from outside work.

The problem of the scarcity of tradesmen is followed by the problem of white collar workers in various areas of specialization. The Graduates' Appointment Department has started to remedy this by appointing interested 1980 and 1981 graduates to be excused from the turn to which they will be assigned in 3 or 4 years, and hundreds of graduates have actually arrived and have been given jobs in North and South Sinai, while hundreds more are on the way. They represent a vanguard of

stability and settlement and a reduction in the burden of the population concentration in the crowded valley, if our enthusiasm to redevelop Sinai continues and does not flag or subside, especially since 500 million pounds are to be allocated for that purpose in the next 5 years, and a few million people will be able to free themselves from the prison of the valley and its increasing problems for a world of new beginnings in the peninsula.

We are now in the town of Abu Zanimah, or the mining town. Here is the Sinai Manganese Company, whose task it is to mine minerals from the heart of the mountains. Fifteen years ago, it exported manganese, which figures in the iron and steel industry, and produced sand for glass manufacture, turquoise and gypsum. Its activity then stopped 13 years ago and its buildings and installations were taken over. Two years ago, after the first withdrawal, some of the young people working there returned, in order to reinject life into it. It is now producing glass sand, which is sold to glass factories in Cairo, and kaolin ore, which is used in the manufacture of porcelain and china, and it is about to resume gypsum production. An economic feasibility study is underway now in the company administration on copper production. Before the occupation of Sinai, it produced 200 kilograms of turquoise a month; its price is 3,000 pounds per kilogram.

Israel was not interested in exploiting the mines of Sinai, because that is an expensive industry and requires much manpower. Rather it was only interested in draining off Sinai's oil, that is, material which it was easy to move and was high-priced.

We proceed along our road through Abu Rudays, the oil town. To our right is the water of the Gulf, with many rigs spread out over its blue surface. From a distance they seem to us like towering edifices, and at night they look like gleaming pearls. The pipelines go out to the point where the oil flows into the super-tankers. New drilling activity in the quest for oil under the Gulf is proceeding at full speed. New companies have started to conquer the area with their installations and rigs. The sign set up along side the road points an arrow toward the giant Belayim field; joy can be seen on the faces of the people riding the bus and a picture of a shining future beguiles their imagination. The person sitting next to me cries out from the bottom of his heart, "May you be prosperous, Egypt!"

We come to the town of al-Tur, the town of which we used to know nothing except that it contained the famous al-Tur penitentiary and the health quarantine cabins for pilgrims to Mecca, who would be "defumigated" and held over for 3 days before they were allowed to continue the return voyage by sea to Suez, to ensure that no epidemics broke out among them. This small, poor town, with all its resources, has started to turn into a jungle of installations. Hundreds of workers with contracting companies are deployed everywhere in order to build a new town.

Al-Tur does not suffer from a water problem; there is a large well and a station to pump its water through a system of pipes that supplies the town and transmits the water to another pipeline to Sharm al-Shaykh 100 kilometers away. Although there are five desalination plants in the latter town, the technical labor required to operate them has not yet been provided.

When I faced the problem of staying over in the capital of South Sinai, where there are no hotels at any level or any restaurants or even coffee-houses, and I found the wooden lodge in which governorate employees and visitors stay filled to the rafters, with three people packed into every room, an agricultural engineer who had come with me on the bus from Cairo invited me to the Department of Agriculture lodge, and it was my good fortune that one of his colleagues in the room had gone off on a vacation. Thus I found lodging for a period of 2 days in the room of Engineer Hilal and Engineer Ahmad. There remained the problem of food. We faced that with canned goods, dividing up bread discs among the three of us when the problem became critical. We drank tea and gave thanks to God that we had found something with which to sustain ourselves!

Governor Fu'ad 'Aziz Ghali was there in Taba, on the border, for several days running, arranging lodging and board for people working at the crossing point between Egypt and Israel. Passport, insurance and Bank of Egypt employees and people working in all other services are in immediate need of cabins in which to work and sleep and from which to buy canned food until the convoys of redevelopment come and an integrated village is built for them. The fact that the governor is there, in the same harsh conditions, has resulted in the rapid arrival and erection of cabins and the orderly progress of work at the crossing point.

There are 350 kilometers between us and the governor, but the secretary general of the governorate, Hamid Nur-al-Din, is residing permanently in the temporary governorate building. The man smiles as he offers me a cup of tea and says, "We are all soldiers here. Most of the people working in the governorate and its various departments and town councils have left their families in the Valley and have come by themselves to live here and bear inconveniences so that the process of building residential apartments and various facilities can be furnished and a life of stability can start."

He added that the governorate had received 44 million pounds, which accounts for half the amount allocated to redevelopment there in the current budget. Sixteen million pounds of this have been paid to Israel for its redevelopment of the Gulf of al-'Aqabah, which had been undeveloped. Seven million pounds were allocated to roads, 2 million to telephones, and 3 million to electricity. Contracts have been made for the construction of 50 apartments in Dhahab, a like number in Nuwaybi' and 25 each in Taba, Ra's Muhammad and Ra's Nasrani, to accommodate the people working there. The Ministry of Agriculture has rapidly undertaken to take over and run the Nuwaybi' farm, which Israel set up over an area of 250 feddans from which it exported melons and flowers.

Eng 'Ali Abu Zayd, the official in charge of redevelopment in al-Tur, said "Life here starts right from zero. At the start of next month, we will be delivering 40 apartments to house employees. Then will follow the delivery of the apartments that have been contracted for, which are 272 in number, besides 200 apartments to house residents whose foundations we have begun to excavate. We are now putting the finishing touches on school buildings, the health unit, the consumer society and the automated bakeries. Had it not been for the companies working in redevelopment activities which set up camps for their workers, we would not have found lodging for anyone."

The agricultural engineer Hamdi 'Abd-al-'Aziz, who is in charge of the first large agricultural experiment in South Sinai, the al-Qa' plain farm 20 miles north of al-Tur, is optimistic about the agricultural future of this plain, which is 1,800 square kilometers in area.

At the beginning, the Desert Institute designated this area as the nucleus for farming in Sinai after ascertaining the quality of the soil and the availability of groundwater there. A year ago the Sinai Redevelopment Agency proceeded to drill seven wells to depths ranging from 80 to 150 meters. Each well irrigates 6 feddans by the drip or spraying method. The cost of the well and irrigation system is 150,000 pounds. The land has been planted with peas, tomatoes, melons, watermelons, guavas, pomegranates and lemons. The first yield in the farm's production has been peas and tomatoes. The fruit has not yet reached the production stage. The experiment is still in the stage of being evaluated before it is expanded.

The experiment to produce sugar beet seeds in the Saint Catherine area, which is distinguished by a low temperature and is unique of its kind and appropriate for this crop, has been a success. Eng Sami Hasr, director general of agriculture, asserts that if an expansion takes place in this experiment, it will be possible to do without imports of sugar beet seeds, whose costs come to 15,000 pounds per ton.

The governorate has established a feedlot in al-Tur for calves for the first time in Sinai, which was familiar only with camel meat and mutton, in order to provide meat locally. It has made a contract with al-Buhayrah Governorate to import calves for the lot.

In the case of fish production from the Gulf of Suez, the governor is trying, through his administration, to convince fishermen to use the launches he has bought for them, on condition that they not go to excess in exploiting the public.

Now, to the committee:

To Sharm-al-Shaykh, Dhahab and Nuwaybi', the apex of beauty and cleanliness.

Muhammad 'Abd-al-Rahman, mayor of the town of Sharm al-Shaykh, calls on the chairman of the Higher Committee for Youth Care and the minister of redevelopment to establish youth camps on the Gulf coast where they can spend the summer and participate in redevelopment activities at wages that will enable them to keep from vying with one another to travel abroad and, in most cases, meet with failure.

We, for our part, are calling on Governor Fu'ad 'Aziz Ghali to set aside some apartments in Sharm al-Shaykh and the tourist village in Nuwaybi' as a summer resort for Egyptians who can be charged rents at reasonable prices, while the hotels and cabins are kept for tourism, so that citizens will not be prevented from enjoying the beauty of the coasts at al-'Aqabah, and also so that they can feel close to this beloved part of their country. To have all the facilities on the coast allocated to tourist activity and not to let Egyptians reside in Sinai would be to continue Sinai's isolation by premeditation!

Finally, we stress that one of the most important problems disturbing the lives of people working in South Sinai is that they do not get papers and radio and television broadcasts. When one realizes that telephone communications with the Valley have not yet started, what can one say about Sharm al-Shaykh, which celebrated the inauguration of its telephone booth a few days ago? One can imagine how dry, harsh and savage life is. People are almost totally cut off from the Valley. They are entitled to have newspaper distribution companies rush to organize their receipt of papers and have the Ministry of Information hasten to establish booster stations so that they can hear and see their country's voice and pictures. It is the height of oppression for us to demand that they sacrifice themselves for the redevelopment of Sinai in the context of hard, severe conditions while we are lax in linking them to the Valley with the printed, spoken and depicted word..

11887

CSO: 4504/361

NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY FORMS SECRETARIAT, VARIOUS COMMITTEES

Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 1 Jun 82 pp 1, 11

/Article: "Formations of the National Part Secretariat General, Coordinating Committees and Heads of Branch Committees"

/Text/ Husni Mubarak, head of the National Party, issued a decree yesterday on the new formation of the party secretariat, which contains 21 members.

Dr Fu'ad Muhyi-al-Din, the prime minister and secretary general of the party, also issued decrees forming 12 committees on government and party coordination and a decree appointing the heads and acting heads of specific central party committees. He also issued a decree on the members of the party newspaper supervising committee and members of the committee on thought, which contains 12 members. Here are the details of the new formations:

The Secretariat General

Dr Fu'ad Muhyi-al-Din, secretary general.
 Muhammad Nabawi Isma'il, member of the Secretariat General.
 Albert Barsum Salamah, member of the Secretariat General.
 Dr Mustafa Kamal Hilmi, member of the Secretariat General.
 Muhammad Rashwan, member of the Secretariat General.
 Muhammad 'Abd-al-Hamid Radwan, member of the Secretariat General.
 Mukhtar Hasan Hani, member of the Secretariat General.
 Safwat Sharif, secretary for information.
 Kamal al-Shadhili, secretary for organization.
 Sayyid Zaki 'Abd-al-Hadi, secretary for tradesmen.
 Mukhtar 'Abd-al-Hamid, member of the Secretariat General.
 Dr Shafiq Balba', member of the Secretariat General.
 Dr Ibrahim Shalabi, member of the Secretariat General.
 Dr 'Abd-al-Ahad Jamal-al-Din, youth secretary.
 'Ali Mansur, secretary for professionals.
 Dr Suhayr al-Qalamawi, secretary for women.
 Dr Mustafa al-Sa'id, member of the Secretariat General.
 Dr Muhammad 'Abdallah, member of the Secretariat General.
 Muhammad Mahdi Shuman, secretary for peasants.
 'Izzat Ghaydan, secretary for commercial and industrial activity.
 Ahmad al-'Amawi, secretary for workers.

Coordinating Committees

Decrees have been issued by the party secretary general on committees on government and party and party member coordination. These are:

Committee on Economic, Plan and Budget Affairs:

Muhammad 'Abd-al-Fattah Ibrahim.
Dr Muhammad Salah-al-Din Hamid.
Dr Kamal Ahmad al-Janzuri.
Dr Fu'ad Hashim 'Awad.
Dr Muhammad Talbah 'Uwaydah.
Fathallah Rif'at.
Dr Mustafa al-Sa'id.
Dr Wajih Shindi.

Committee on Housing, Redevelopment and New Communities

Eng Hasaballah al-Kafrawi.
Eng Husayn 'Uthman.
Eng Muhibb Ramzi Istinu.

Committee on Agriculture and Irrigation:

Eng Muhammad 'Abd-al-Hadi Samahah.
Dr Yusuf Wali.
Eng Ahmad 'Abd-al-Akhir.
Muhammad Mahdi Shuman.
Eng Sa'id Jijris.

Maintenance and Power Committee:

Eng Ahmad 'Izz-al-Din Hilal.
Eng Muhammad Mahir Abazah.
Eng Jamal al-Sayyid Ibrahim.
Eng Fu'ad Abu Zaghlah.
Eng 'Abd-al-Wahhab al-Habbak.
Dr Ahmad 'Umar

The Transportation and Communications Committee:

Eng Sulayman Mitwalli.
Eng 'Abd-al-Fattah 'Abdallah.
Eng Muhyi-al-Din 'Abd-al-Latif.

The Health and Family Planning Committee:

Dr Muhammad Sabri Zaki.
Dr Mahmud Mahfuz.
Dr Ahmad al-Binhawi.
Dr Hamdi Mahmud al-Sayyid.

The Committee on Education and Scientific Research:

Dr Mustafa Kamal Hilmi
Dr Muhammad Kamil Laylah.
Dr Hasan Hamdi.
Dr Muhammad Mahmud Radwan.

The Supply and Trade Committee:

Ahmad Ahmad Nuh.
Dr Jalal Abu-al-Dhahab.
Hasan 'Id 'Ammar.

The Committee on Culture and Information:

Muhammad Safwat al-Sharif.
Muhammad 'Abd-al-Hamid Radwan.
'Abd-al-Mun'im al-Sawi.
Dr Suhayr al-Qalamawi.

The Committee on Insurance and Social Affairs:

Dr Amal 'Uthman
Dr 'Abd-al-Wudud Yahya
Dr Muhammad Mahjub.
Husayn Wishahi.

The Committee on Legislative and Constitutional Affairs:

Counsellor Ahmad Samir Sami.
Mukhtar Hani.
Hafiz Badawi.
'Ali Mansur.

The Popular Organization Committee:

Eng 'Uthman Ahmad 'Uthman.
Sa'd Muhammad al-Sharbini.

A decree issued by the secretary general will determine the tasks of these committees, their method of operation, and coordination between them and the corresponding committees in the People's and Consultative Assemblies.

Chairmen and Acting Chairmen of the Specific Party Committees

1. The Legal Affairs Committee:

Mukhtar Hasan Hani, chairman.
Hafiz Badawi, acting chairman.
'Ali Mansur, acting chairman.

2. The Social Affairs Committee:

Dr Mustafa al-Sa'id, chairman.
Fathallah Rif'at, acting chairman.

3. The Plan and Budget Committee:

Dr Wajih Shindi, chairman
Dr Muhammad Talbah 'Uwaydah, acting chairman.

4. The Committee on Education and Scientific Research:

Dr Hasan Hamdi, chairman.
Dr Muhammad Kamil Laylah, acting chairman.

5. Committee on Industry and Power:

Dr Ahmad 'Umar, chairman.
Eng 'Abd-al-Wahhab al-Habbak, acting chairman.

6. The Committee on Agriculture and Irrigation:

Eng Ahmad 'Abd-al-Akhir, chairman.
Muhammad Mahdi Shuman, acting chairman.

7. The Committee on Culture and Information:

'Abd-al-Mun'im al-Sawi, chairman.
Dr Suhayr al-Qalamawi, acting chairman.

8. The Committee on Health and Family Planning:

Dr Ahmad al-Binhawi, chairman.
Dr Hamdi Muhammad al-Sayyid, acting chairman.

9. The Transportation and Communications Committee:

Eng 'Abd-al-Fattah 'Abdallah, chairman.
Eng Muhyi-al-Din 'Abd-al-Latif, acting chairman.

10. The Committee on Housing and Redevelopment:

Eng Husayn 'Uthman, chairman.
Eng Muhibb Ramzi Istinu, acting chairman.

11. The Interior and Local Government Committee:

Maj Gen Muhammad al-Binhawi, chairman.
Kamal Henri Badir, acting chairman.
Muhammad Hamdi 'Ashur, acting chairman.
'Abd-al-Fattah al-Dali, acting chairman.

12. The Insurance and Social Affairs Committee:

Dr 'Abd-al-Wudud Yahya, chairman.
Husayn Wishahi, acting chairman.
Dr Muhammad 'Ali Mahjub, acting chairman.

Article 2. /sic/ This decree will be in effect as of the date it is issued.

Committee To Supervise Party Newspapers:

Safwat al-Sharif, chairman.
Shaykh Ibrahim al-Dassuqi, member.
Dr Jamal al-'Utayfi, member.
Dr 'Adil 'Izz, member.
Dr Hamdi al-Sayyid, member.
Dr Muhammad 'Abdallah, member.
The chairman of the board of the Mayu Organization, member.
The editor in chief of MAYU, member.
The editor in chief of AL-LIWA' AL-ISLAMI, member.

The Committee on Thought:

Dr Subhi 'Abd-al-Hakim, chairman
Dr Mustafa Kamal Hilmi, vice chairman.
Dr Amal 'Uthman, member.
Dr Butrus Ghali, member.
Mukhtar Hani, member.
Safwat al-Sharif, member.
Ibrahim al-Dassuqi, member.
Dr Kamil Laylah, member.
'Abd-al-Mun'im al-Sawi, member.
Mansur Hasan, member.
Dr 'Adil 'Izz, member.
Dr Mustafa al-Sa'id, member.

'Abbas Safi-al-Din Is Secretary of the National Party Fund

Dr Fu'ad Muhyi-al-Din, the prime minister and secretary general of the National Party, has issued a decree appointing 'Abbas Safi-al-Din secretary of the party fund.

11887

CSO: 4504/346

NEW PASSPORT DESIGN, PROCEDURES TO BE INSTITUTED

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 7 Jun 82 p 8

/Article: "Start on Producing New Passports Next Year"/

/Text/ The Ministry of the Interior has determined to start work in the center for the production of new passports at the start of next year. The costs of constructing it came to 61 million pounds and its goal is to protect passports from forgery and waste. Agreement was reached with the public sector companies importing paper to import special paper for the new passports along with ink and printing materials and equipment.

Maj Gen 'Isam al-Ramali, director of the Criminal Evidence Department, stated that the new passports would gradually be put into circulation after the periods within which the citizens must commit themselves to handing over old ones and receiving new ones has been set. The number of passports for citizens is to total 2,000 a day, instead of the 1,000 new passports that are now issued every day, and the anticipated volume of production is to reach 2 million passports a year.

He added that in the coming period all the Arab and foreign countries will be informed of the conditions and specifications for new passports and the offices receiving applications from citizens will be increased, while the existing ones are consolidated.

Mr Hasan Abu Basha, minister of the interior, inspected the new passport center in the headquarters of the Egyptian Central Bank's banknote paper printing house out by the Pyramids yesterday.

Mr Hasan Abu Basha stated that construction on the new center started 3 years ago and it contains the most modern equipment, apparatuses for monitoring the movement of individuals and surveillance, and warning systems against fire, theft and breakage that modern science has come up with. This will be a comprehensive facility, since the production steps will be started and completed in one location.

11887

CSO: 4504/354

LEFTIST NEWSPAPER CELEBRATES REINSTATEMENT

Cairo AL-AHALI in Arabic 26 May 82 p 6

/Text/ A most enormous mass of Egyptian political contradictions gathered together last Wednesday in Mahmud 'Azmi Hall of the Journalists' Union. The occasion: the celebration of the reception which AL-AHALI held to commemorate its reissuance.

The party was packed with people from the left, right and center; in it, the opposition mixed with the government, workers mixed with businessmen, incoming ministers mixed with former ministers, July revolutionaries mixed with supporters of 15 May, and released prisoners mixed with state security investigation officers.

Attending the party were Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal and Musa Sabri! The American press secretary met there with his Chinese and Vietnamese counterparts, and it was attended by the former head of the Journalists' Union, Kamil Zuhayri, and the present one, Salah Jalal. Fikri Makram 'Ubayd shook hands with Mansur Hasan, and the minister of culture, 'Abd-al-Hamid Radwan, sent a large bouquet of flowers, while the current minister of information did not attend and did not send a bouquet of palm fronds. Three former ministers of information attended, including Muhammad Fayiq, who received greetings on the occasion of the issuance of the first book by the al-Mustaqbal al-'Arabi Publishing House, which he runs.

Among the leaders of the Labor Party, Ibrahim Shukri, Hilmi Murad, Fu'ad Nushi and Ibrahim Yunus were in attendance, and among the editorial staff of AL-SHA'B were Hamid Zaydan and 'Abd-al-Qadir Shuhayb. From the Liberal Party and its paper came Ambassador Riyadh Mu'awwad, Wahid Ghazi and Tharwat Shalabi. Among the lawyers were Dr 'Ismat Sayf-al-Dawlah, Farid 'Abd-al-Karim, 'Abd-al-'Aziz Muhammad and 'Abd-al-Halim Ramadan.

From the editorial staff of AL-JUMHURIYAH came its assistant editor in chief, Muhammad al-Hayawan, who is prohibited from working and writing; he is the Egyptian journalist who admits to being a dyed-in-the-wool rightwinger, boasts of it and defends it. He saluted the journalistic efforts exerted in AL-AHALI and refused to make any statements on why he had been prohibited from working.

From AL-AHRAM came Mustafa Bahjat Badawi, Yusuf Idris, Sami Mansur and Inji Rushdi. Not attending was the editor in chief of AL-MUSAWWAR, Makram Muhammad Ahmad, who

is trying to turn the al-Hilal House into a true nationwide press. Lutfi 'Abd-al-'Azim, the editor in chief of AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI, listened patiently to the explanation he received from the editor of AL-AHBARIYAH on the appeal he made to him in the last issue; the editor stated that the appeal was directed to the national papers so that they might emulate the good example of AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI.

Among the artists and men of letters, Samihah Ayyub, Karam Mutawa', Muhsinah Tawfiq, Ahmad Fu'ad Najm, In'am Muhammad 'Ali, Nu'man 'Ashur 'Abd-al-Rahman and 'Atiyat al-Ibnudi attended, from the office of the paper AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Washington came 'Imad Adib, and from its office in Cairo came 'Umar 'Abd-al-Sami'. Representing the university professors were Hasan Hanafi, 'Abd-al-Muhsin Taha Badr, 'Awatif 'Abd-al-Rahman, Jawdah 'Abd-al-Khaliq, Karimah Karim, Shadiyah al-Shishini and Sa'id al-Nishani.

Excusing themselves for not attending were the ministers of the economic group, headed by Muhammad 'Abd-al-Fattah Ibrahim, owing to a general meeting. Ahmad Nuh, the minister of supply, published a salute to the re-emergency of AL-AHALI in the AL-AHRAM society page, while Maj Gen Sayyid Zaki, manager of public relations in the Ministry of the Interior, attended. He has solid relationships with journalists, is the editor in chief of the magazine AL-SHURTAH and also headed up the press office in the office of the state security investigator for a long time. He faced severe interrogation from Mrs Samihah al-Burullusi, wife of our press colleague Sa'd Zahran, concerning the conditions of political prisoners in the course of a long discussion in which Mrs Samihah advised opposition leaders not to forget their colleagues who still are in prison. Maj Gen Zaki begged off, on grounds that he is now a journalist, not an investigator, and no longer has any relationship to investigative work, besides being the only witness who heard the editor in chief of AL-AHALI in the case of the January incidents, whose review began 72 hours after the party. The Palestinian presence at the party was prominent. Attending were Umm al-Mu'minin (the sister of Abu 'Ammar), Muhammad Subayh, FATH's representative to the Solidarity Organization, Nabil Sha'th, member of the Revolutionary Council of the organization, and the fighting woman Fatimah Barnawi. An editor of AL-AHALI had suspicions about two foreigners, thinking them to be Israelis. After rapid investigation it became evident that they were American and the state of emergency was lifted. It is true that the party was a "political stew," but not to that degree.

Of the editors in chief of the nationwide papers, only Musa Sabri attended and he saluted AL-AHALI the following day on the pages of AL-AKHBAR. The other colleagues did not attend, did not excuse their absences and did not salute AL-AHALI, from which we conclude that relations between us and our nationwide colleagues need a little "embargo." Would that the nationwide colleagues were modest and dealt with us the way they deal with YEDIOT AHARONOT and AL HAMISHMAR--for heaven's sake, people, this is Arabic!

The extreme affection with which the editorial staff of AL-AKHBAR treated AL-AHALI was remarkable, and that prompted some of AL-AHALI's editors to say:

"May God bring them good things!"

"And character is more commendable!"

11887

CSO: 4504/354

BRIEFS

MEDITERRANEAN GAS EXPLORATION--The Egyptian Government has decided to expand gas drilling in the Mediterranean and to double the production of natural gas in the underwater field at Abu-Kir, 40 kilometers from the shores of Alexandria. According to the plan, Egypt will invest \$190 million this year in nine new underwater drilling efforts. As a result of these drillings, natural gas production of the Abu-Kir field will be doubled, to 200 million square feet of gas per day. A large amount of natural gas will supply a considerable part of the energy needs of Alexandria and the surrounding area and "will free" a million tons of gasoline per year for export. The investment in the project will be covered mostly by the European Investment Bank and by the World Bank, and to a lesser extent by the Egyptian National Gas Company. It should be noted that many years ago the World Bank stopped granting loans to Israel on the grounds that Israel is a "developed country." The European Investment Bank, which is an institute of the Common Market, does no business in Israel, despite Israel's efforts in that direction. According to the plan, the project is to be completed in 1984. [Text] [Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARDNOT in Hebrew 20 Apr 82 p 17] 9944

NEW AIDE DE CAMP--President Husni Mubarak issued a decree yesterday appointing Staff Maj Gen Mahmud 'Ali al-Misri senior aide de camp and commander of the military forces in the Office of the President. Maj Gen al-Misri was born in 1925, graduated from the War College in 1952 and the Nasir Higher Military Academy in 1974, and was a prominent commander in the October 1973 war, receiving a military star of honor, the highest of military decorations. He rose gradually through unit and formation command positions to division commander, then commander of the Republican Guard in 1975. /Text/ /Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 7 Jun 82 p 1/ 11887

CSO: 4504/354

REASONS FOR, RESULTS OF COUNTRY'S VICTORY ANALYZED

Zurich NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG in German NO 139 20/21 Jun 82 p 6

[text] The Iranian victories in Khuzistan can without any doubt be attributed mainly to the readiness of the Iranian soldiers, officers, revolutionary guards and volunteers (Bassij) to go into action. The "Islamic Armed Forces," as these three very different units are called in common, were better motivated than the Iraqi forces. The reasons are easy to understand: The Iranian troops were acting out of patriotism; it was a question of first defending parts of their country which had been attacked and later liberating them again; then they acted for religious motives: The revolutionary guards and many volunteers wanted to help to protect the "Islamic Revolution," which they had helped to victory in their own country, at the cost of many lives, from an attack from outside. This attack is always presented by official Iranian propaganda as being "inspired by America." On this point almost all Iranians seem to be convinced of this claim, so that there is a widespread opinion that they are fighting not only against the "infidel" Saddam Hussein but also indirectly against the "great devil," the United States, against which their revolution was directed in the first place. In contrast to the Iranians, whose country had been partially occupied, the Iraqis were not prepared to fight to the utmost. For over 1 and 1/2 years they had been in enemy territory without achieving further successes, after they had advanced deep into the enemy's country in the first 2 months of the war.

Triple-Tiered Armed Forces

Two additional reasons that contributed to the Iranians' victory can also be mentioned: The civilian, spiritual and military authorities were able to build up a unique kind of military force which was able to appeal to and mobilize the different segments of the population, because it was divided into the regular army, the revolutionary guards and the volunteers. "Technocrats," influenced by Western civilization, found their place in the technologically well-equipped regular army, which still dates from the time of the Shah; Islamic revolutionaries and followers of Khomeyni were accepted into the second army of the Pasdaran, and members of the older generation, who still clung to the Islamic traditions, as well as the very young age groups were combined under the heading of "Bassij." This arrangement of mobilization on three levels allowed the Iranians to utilize their superior numbers. Their country has three times as many inhabitants as Iraq; but they had to be mobilized and motivated first in accordance with their way of thinking before they could be sent into battle. Coordination of the three groups seems to have begun only after

the political power struggle in Tehran between the Islamic forces which had a more modern outlook, grouped around President Bani-Sadr, and the claims of the clergy to the leadership had been decided. Until Bani-Sadr's dismissal in June 1981, the two political groups tried to keep "their" troops separated from those of their rivals. Bani-Sadr tried to stay in power with the help of the regular army; the clergy of the Islamic Revolutionary Party, which was in the midst of the struggle at the time, looked to the revolutionary guards for support. After the end of the power struggle, the decision was made to consolidate the army high command and to create joint staffs at the regional commander level. The mobilization of the volunteers came later, as a third, supplementary element. In this way an "Islamic Force" of over 400,000 men was created; the volunteers can be estimated to number about 50,000, the regular army at perhaps 150,000 and the Pasdaran (revolutionary guards) at 200,000. To this can be added a newly organized gendarmerie.

The Iranian Liberation Strategy

The third precondition for the victory in Khuzistan is probably the fact that the "Islamic Armed Forces" had developed a strategic plan for their campaign and they were able to execute it--in contrast to the Iraqi troops, who were basically only waiting for the Iranians to accept a peace that met the wishes of Baghdad.

After the formation of the new "mixed" troops, the Iranian strategic plan first called for straightening out the salient in the front which had isolated parts of Abadan. The offensive against the salient (I on the accompanying map) began on 21 September 1981 (almost 1 year after the beginning of the war) and resulted in the liberation of the area to the east of the Karun River. According to Iranian figures, 2,000 Iraqis were killed and a tank division was destroyed. The Iranians do not, on principle, announce how high their own losses were.

Then the "Islamic Armed Forces" turned to the task of dividing the front into two parts. In February 1981 they began a thrust in the Bostan sector (II on the map), which brought them to the border, after heavy fighting in which several Iraqi counterattacks were beaten off. It helped the Iranians that they were able to use a swampy area to the north of the Bostan front, which had not been occupied by Iraqi troops, as a jumping-off point. According to Iranian figures, 900 prisoners of war were taken during the offensive at Bostan. The enemy lost 5,000 dead and 3 brigades were wiped out.

Diversionsary Attacks in the North, the Main Offensive in the South

The next thrust came in March 1982, in the northern section of Shush (III). During this offensive it is claimed that 15,000 prisoners of war were taken and a motorized division was largely destroyed. One objective of this offensive in the north was very probably to pin down large numbers of enemy troops on the northern front, while the decisive strike was being prepared in the south.

On 13 April the so-called Jerusalem Offensive began (IV) with the night crossing of the Karun River. On the morning of the 14th, the causeway linking Ahwaz with Khorramshahr was reached. The attack was then extended to the west, to continue along the border to the south. Simultaneously, a three-pronged encirclement and relief attack in the central [text missing] in the northern section of Shush a relief attack was begun to the west.

the central sector the Iranians claim to have taken 3,900 prisoners; in the southern sector outside Khorramshahr 2,800 and in Khorramshahr itself, which they reached from the west, that is to say from the rear, 11,000. A move to encircle the Iraqis in the central sector completely was not successful because the Iraqi troops retreated in time across the border. But in Khorramshahr almost half of the garrison was taken prisoner, wounded or killed. The other half seems to have escaped across improvised pontoon bridges over the Shatt.

Remaining Pockets of Iraqis

On the Khuzistan front only the northern border town of Fakhri now remains in Iraqi hands. But farther to the north, the Iraqis still occupy towns along the border such as Dehloran, Mehran, Qasr-i-Shirin and Marivan. Qasr-i-Shirin, which lies on the main road between Bagdad and Tehran and is only about 200 kms from Bagdad, is particularly important. It is still uncertain whether the Iranians will carry their offensive into Iraq. A decision about that will have to be made at the very latest when all the areas west of the old border have been recaptured.

Khuzistan can be considered liberated now, which is particularly significant in view of the oil industry there. The war damage is enormous. An engineer who formerly worked in Abadan estimated the costs of reconstruction alone for the almost totally destroyed Abadan refinery, the largest in the world, at \$14 billion. Tehran has demanded \$150 billion in war reparations.

The mobilization of the Persian people and the creation of a triple-tier army, which has proved its superiority on the battlefield, will have political consequences for the future. The Iranians are already confronting the Arabs, not only the Iraqis, but also the Gulf states and the Saudi Arabians, with much greater self-confidence than before.

9581

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COMMANDER EXPLAINS HOW ARMY AVIATION TRIUMPHED

Tehran IRAN PRESS DIGEST in English 15 Jun 82 pp 15-16

[Interview with Col 'Ali Sa'id Niyam, commander of IRI Army Aviation]

[Text] "It is the power of faith which compels the soldiers of Islam, equipped with simple and elementary weapons, to penetrate to the heart of the enemy"--
Commander of Army Aviation.

Colonel Ali Saeed Niam, the Commander of Army Aviation of the Islamic Republic, held an exclusive interview with the magazine, OMID-E-ENGHLAB (HOPE OF THE REVOLUTION). Excerpts from the interview are presented as hereunder:

Question: Kindly elaborate on the recent operations which resulted in victory of our troops.

Answer: In my opinion a classic comparison cannot be made between this war and other wars, or any explanations given within the framework of any particular formula. It is not possible to try to solve this problem by resorting to classic formulas. Only the compassion and beneficence of God Almighty can account for our victories throughout the battlefronts.

Question: What sections does Army Aviation consist of, and how does each section operate?

Answer: Army Aviation consists of two sections. One section provides fire support for our troops through combat helicopters, which are fighting against the enemy side by side with the soldiers of Islam. Another section consists of helicopters who evacuate the wounded from the battlefronts, and also carry troops to any part of the battlefronts rapidly and quickly.

Question: Generally speaking what is the importance of Army Aviation in any war and how successful has our Army Aviation been in comparison to the enemy's?

Answer: In our Army Aviation tactic has been combined with faith, and it is the power of faith which compels the soldiers of Islam, equipped with elementary weapons, to penetrate to the very heart of the enemy. During the operations code-named "Beit-al-Moghaddas" (Jerusalem) two enemy helicopters were shot down by our units. One of them was exploded in mid-air, and the other one was shot down as it apparently came to the rescue of the helicopter that had already been shot down.

Among the helicopters of the enemy which have fallen into our hands in good condition is a Soviet-built helicopter, which is apparently used to transport troops and personnel. We have dismantled some of the equipment on board the helicopter, and research is being conducted on the weapons it carried.

Following the departure of the Americans from this country in the wake of the revolution, there was a feeling initially that Army Aviation may possibly face certain problems and difficulties. But the faith of our personnel, coupled with their spirit of cooperation, enabled them to overcome existing problems, and our combat readiness is even better today than during the shah's time.

Question: Can you tell us something about the type and number of operations carried out by Army Aviation?

Answer: Army Aviation units participated in all the operations of the war, such as the operations which took place in Chazzabeh, and Abadan, and the operations code-named "Beit-al-Moghaddas" and "Fath-al-Mobin." The personnel of Army Aviation tolerated tremendous pressures during the operations associated with the evacuation of wounded troops.

Question: How is coordination between the Army Aviation and other military forces?

Answer: With a view to coordinating our efforts with other forces, we placed several combat teams at the disposal of each command headquarters. If the command headquarters are not within the range of enemy guns, the combat teams will be based on the site of the headquarters themselves, otherwise they will establish their base at a safe distance from the headquarters. (From: "Omid-e-Enghelab") - No 34, dt. June 5, 1982.

CSO: 4600/597

MISSION, RECORD OF REVOLUTION GUARD CORPS REVIEWED

Tehran IRAN PRESS DICEST in English 15 Jun 82 pp 17-20

[Interview with Javad Mansuri, first commander of the IRGC]

[Excerpt] Javad Mansouri, who is currently the deputy Foreign Minister and had at one time been chosen as the First Commander of the Corps (March 1979), said on this issue (Bani-Sadr's opposition to IRGC), "Bani-Sadr's being made commander-in-chief of the armed forces was the hardest blow struck on the Corps during its existence, but it was able to escape the danger which threatened it. This danger perhaps even brought the corps more solidity. Bani-Sadr's command caused strong disunion within the corps and among many good, pious forces for whom work inside the corps had become impossible, and Bani-Sadr often said openly that such people should be expelled from IRGC. The relations between the IRGC and the army were also very bad, which prevented the corps from spreading and reaching full growth. I remember how often I asked Shadmehr, head of the Common (Army and IRGC) Staff at the time of Bani-Sadr, to give the corps the necessary equipment in proportion to the operations it is commissioned to make, and he used to answer frankly that they give no arms to the corps, and the guards had to arm themselves by disarming the enemy only." (Jomhuri Islami, May 27).

Saiyed Ahmad Khomeyni too has said in confirmation of this point that Bani-Sadr always complained to Imam about the leadership of the corps until finally Imam was compelled to forbid him from talking about the corps and told him to leave the corps alone. (Payam-e-Enqelab, May 29)

After Bani-Sadr was removed (July 1981), the corps began a fresh life. It now had the opportunity to wage an open battle against armed leftist groups and suppressing them. On the battlefronts, the corps were supplied with adequate arms and weapons, their relations with the army improved, and they were able to demonstrate their ability in defending their country and the Islamic regime.

Apart from these, the Corps had to overcome some internal problems also (which may still exist). Some of the founders of the corps held the conviction that the most important duty of the corps is to bring about revolution in other

Moslem countries and topple the present reactionary regimes in the region. But Imam did not share such a view. Sayyed Ahmad Khomeyni says about the different views concerning the issue, "Shaikh Mohammad Montazeri, for example, believed that he had to set fire to the region, and only then the role of the corps, in exporting the revolution could be well observed. He stuck strictly to this line. I talked to him on several occasions and told him, 'Well supposing you want to set fire to the region, do you think we have the necessary power to do so?' He answered, 'We should not wait for them to come and seize and occupy Iran and only then, when everything is over, begin our work. It is no use staying here.' He even proposed that Imam and some others (like me) go to another reactionary regional country and begin there everything anew from the start, since now Imam has liberated Iran and there is nothing left to do here. Imam was opposed to this approach. Imam has openly said that 'We should leave aside the idea of not exporting our revolution; we will export our revolution.' If there is a difference, it is in the forms and methods to implement it. We all hold dear the idea of Islamic republics being installed under supervision of a central government; everybody likes the idea, but there are differences in the methods and approaches and so on." (Payam-e-Enqelab, May 29)

However, the IRGC now enjoys unprecedented power and solidity after three years and seems to have overcome most of its problems.

Part II. The Present Condition. The IRGC is now one of the revolutionary institutions formed to defend the revolution and safeguard its achievements, according to Article 150 of the Constitution. The same article says that the limits of duties and responsibilities of these corps.... will be specified by the law.

Being a new and unprecedented institution, the IRGC's limits of the duties and responsibilities have not been clear for its commanders either. Therefore, in addition to having several successive commanders (Javed Mansouri, Abu-Sharif, Morteza Rezaee, and Mohsen Rezaee) it has changed 5 (IRGC) Constitutions so far, the last of which was recently approved by the Majlis. Javad Mansouri, in charge of the cultural branch of the corps, says in this respect, "In fact I can say that the corps is changing and developing from day to day. With each new day, those in charge of the different branches and divisions of the corps have new experiences and realize the necessity of making certain changes in their work. That is the reason for the continuous changes in the organisational staff, description of duties, regulations, etc., and even the IRGC Constitution passed by the Majlis was probably the fifth one written, and in time this one may change too when necessary, since the form and the organisation and directions and methods are permanently changing. But this organ has now obtained such a popular base and such a power that cannot be overlooked or neglected; so we should make it in whatever changes, practice necessities." (Jomhuri Islami, May 17)

Some articles of this IRGC Constitution, specify the main functions of the corps as follows: Article 3 - Lawful confrontation against the elements that resort to use of force, in an attempt to negate the sovereignty of IRI laws; Article 8 - Cooperation with the national intelligence organisation, in line with the law to be ratified by the Islamic Consultative Assembly; Article 11 - Cooperation with and activity in the sphere of promoting the Islamic education on the basis of the guidelines of the "Velayat-e-Faghih." (Jomhuri Islami, May 29)

The IRGC is presently such a vast organisation that military activity constitutes only one of its functions. The guards are chosen with the utmost care from among deserving volunteers. Mansouri says about the methods used to choose the guards, "Membership in the corps naturally has particular sensitivity, owing to which the guards have to be picked out with utmost care. Fortunately the department in charge of picking out the guards has continuously developed and discovered new methods which prevent the infiltration of undesirable elements into the corps. The IRGC now has a vast department called 'Reception' with methods of its own; and even many of the ministries and governmental organizations are inclined to use these experiences and this organization in choosing their own personnel.

Those chosen attend a one or two-month intensive military training course in the garrisons (which includes ideological and religious training also) and then, if they prove qualified and pass the ideological tests as well as the military, physical ones, they can wear the uniform of the guards.

There is no such a hierarchy in the IRGC as in the army. There exists intimate, brotherly relations here between the commanders and the guards. The functions of the IRGC currently include:

- Cooperation with the army in defending the country.
- Confrontation against the rebel armed forces in different areas.
- Mobilising and preparing the forces of Public Mobilisation for reconstruction operations and sending aid behind the frontlines.
- Confrontation against saboteurs and opposition groups.
- Careful supervision over the army and other police organs, to prevent infiltration of destructive elements or deviation of the personnel.
- Propagating the principles of the Islamic Revolution both inside and outside the country and establishing relations with Moslem Liberation Movements.

In his recent interview, Sayied Ahmad Khomeyni has well depicted the vast, various functions of the IRGC: "The corps which is a guardian of the achievements of the revolution, wants to expand the rule of God's law throughout the

world. To perform this, a guard must first know the revolution, know what he is safeguarding and why. He must also know the counterrevolution, because he wants to fight against it. He must know from which directions or in which grounds the revolution has been or may be attacked, so that he can be present there to defend the revolution. He should know colonialism in both its old and new disguises; hence the need for an "organ" in the corps, to study the regional countries and world countries. He should know the opposition groups inside the country, from the armed ones, what they say and why they fight and what they want to replace IRI with, to the silent ones, the Tudeh Party and Majority Fedayeen. Why are they silent? Does this silence mean agreement with IRI? Which it cannot. Then why are they silent? He should even know the religious groups which apparently support IRI but we know that they cannot adjust themselves to the kind of Islam ruling here (Veleyat-e-Faghih). He should know all the dangers threatening what he is safeguarding, from military danger to economic, political, and cultural dangers. If the government concludes a treaty which seriously endangers the revolution, it is the duty of the cultural branch and publications department of the IRGC to warn the government of the consequences (I am not recommending military confrontation). The publications of the IRGC must be the language of our revolutionary forces. If the government supposedly attack "Ekhvan-al-Muslemeen," it is the duty of the IRGC's publications to ask the government not to treat it alike, all the different groups composing "Ekhvan-al-Muslemeen" and to explain the differences. How can we limit the functions of the IRGC to military ones, excluding all these non-military functions? If the IRGC is to safeguard the revolutionary achievements, revolution and counterrevolution must be known, and who is more qualified to study and know them than the IRGC itself which is to safeguard them also.

From the military point of view, we see that it is fighting on the front lines and must fight inside the country also, against the hypocrites (Mujahedeen) and Fedayeen and the Tudeh Party. So it has a military role. But it should have an important role in other fields, also. If there is something wrong in the program for cultural revolution, it is the IRGC that should mention it. So whatever concerns the revolution, concerns the IRGC also, even the Ministry of Commerce and the banks and so on. If the role of propaganda for expansion of revolutionary culture which is an indispensable part of the revolution is denied the IRGC, then it will become a military force defending the revolution and Iran, in the same way as the army (Payan-e-Enqelab, May 29)

Since the beginning of the current year, the revolutionary guards have been prohibited from any dependence to political groups. Imam's representative in the IRGC, Hojjatol-Islam Taheri, says on this issue: "After Imam's order, the corps first distributed a circular in which all the guards in some way dependent on one of the Islamic groups, had been asked to resign either from the IRGC or from their own group, and in a recent circular they have been asked to do so in ten days time. There have been some questions regarding this problem, and Imam has answered the questions in person; these will later

be published in "Payan-e-Enqelab." I hope from now on nobody will remain in the IRGC or the armed forces with any kind of dependence to the "political groups." (Jomhuri Islami, May 27) He emphasised that many of the guards have resigned after Imam's orders.

One of the remarkable activities of the IRGC is its publications, including two weekly and monthly magazines and various books. Some titles of the books:

--Bani-Sadr and Hypocrites (Mujahedeen), the Reserves of Imperialism.

--Political Sociology of Afghanistan.

--Jonbesh-e-Mosalmanan-e-Mobarez (Movement of Militant Moslems).

There exists Public Mobilization (PM) also alongside of the IRGC, which needs a separate survey and demonstrated its abilities in the war against Iraq. The IRGC was able to mobilise about 160 thousand PM volunteers for the war and send them to the warfronts. Taheri says about the relation between the IRGC and PM, "Now the IRGC and PM are in fact a single organ but choose their members in two different levels and there are some differences in the conditions of membership. There is, of course, a close relation between them. The Head of PM is in the IRGC Council. (Jomhuri Islami, May 27)

CSO: 4600/596

REOPENING OF UNIVERSITIES DISCUSSED BY MONARCHIST PAPER

Paris IRAN LIBRE in French 19 Apr 82 pp 1-3

[Article: "The New University"]

[Text] After 19 months of closing imposed by the Islamic regime, some Iranian universities reopened their doors on 1 February 1982.

What is the new shape of higher education in Iran? Which students are authorized to study? Who are the teachers? What are the disciplines taught? Will there be political debates in the new university? Islamic officials were asked all these questions. Some answers were clearly given; others remained extremely vague. According to our sources, the situation is as follows:

Considered one of the bastions of the revolutions, the Iranian university was the favorite spot of revolutionaries of all opinions during the first days of the Islamic overthrow. Turned into the Friday Prayer Center for the capital, the University of Teheran was also the center of political activities. There the leftist militants (Mojahedin, Fedayin, Peykari, etc.) and the Khomeyniists met and then confronted each other. Between 1979 and 1980 ideological discussions turned into violent confrontations. Hezbollahis who did not belong to student circles often intervened in the brawls, when they were not provoking them. The University of Teheran, imitated by the provincial universities, became a veritable arena where very violent fighting took place. Following an unexpected incident in April 1980 at the University of Tabriz, while Rafsanjani, the president of the Islamic Parliament was giving a speech there, the authorities were prompted to react. It took only a few weeks from then for the Khomeyniists' argumentation to win: the closing of the universities was announced on 4 May 1980.

During the following months, a cultural revolution was decided on and a staff for this revolution created. This staff had the objective of developing a new pedagogy consistent with the principles of Khomeyniism. According to Rafsandjani's own statement, it proved incapable of doing so at that time. But perceiving that it was dangerous to maintain idle students any longer, the leaders of the Islamic Republic finally decided to reopen some of the

faculties*, simply taking several measures which were fragmentary and insignificant. For the rest, they wanted to wait for the implementation of a program which, according to them, will be applied gradually.

No one knows anything about the mollahs' famous educational program, and for good reason. The principles of medical education remain particularly difficult to determine and are presently giving way to delicate dealings between specialists and religious authorities. As things stand at present, the examination of a patient of the opposite sex is governed by a series of prohibitions and instructions personally devised by Khomeyni which make diagnosis impossible, if not dangerous! On the other hand, the regime is especially seeking to train schoolmasters and teachers in secondary education. Everything that formerly was under the Teachers Training College will henceforth belong to the University. This is the only point where it has been strengthened. Because artists and generally speaking any followers of the occupations deemed "frivolous" are no longer wanted, openings must indeed be found for young people, and those who were "misoriented" must be reoriented.

The first students to benefit from this reopening are exclusively those who had only 25 more credits to pass at the time of the closing decided on in 1980. New subjects have simply been added to their original program. Of course, religious instruction will be given to them by the mollahs.

On the other hand, the student population will be purged. All young people who are not approved by the just established "admission councils" will be expelled. In order to be admitted to the reopened universities, it is necessary to meet certain conditions. Two criteria have been set: those of pre- and post-Khomeyniism.

First: those who, right or wrong, are suspected of having, before the revolution, cooperated with the SAVAK, strengthened the imperial regime, spied for foreign powers or belonged to free masonry are under interdict.

Second: Individuals suspected of having participated in the following activities after the revolution will no longer be able to be students: rebellion against the Islamic regime, affiliation in foreign organizations**, collecting information for foreign powers or prohibited organizations***, support for prohibited groups, armed action, political blackmail, trafficking in arms and munitions, destruction of documents, receiving official documents, oral or written propaganda against the Islamic Republic, etc.

What will become of the teachers?

* The universities of Tehran, Shiraz and Tabriz each provide a specific sector of education. Tehran, for example, is entrusted with technological and scientific disciplines.

** Mojahedin minority Fedayin Peykari, etc.

*** Ibid.

Those of the teachers who were not expelled or retired will be able to strengthen their religious culture and on this formal condition will be empowered to teach again.

In any event, filtering will take place: the teachers are also subject to control in order to practice their profession. A teacher will have to meet 60 conditions. Here are a few: to be of Iranian nationality, to be Muslim, to be just, pious and practicing, to be committed to the Islamic Revolution, to respect the constitution and believe in the Ayatollah Khomeyni's supremacy, not to have a previous history with the former regime and only finally to have the necessary scientific and pedagogical skills.

As far as political debate at the University is concerned, the authorities acknowledge that the students can never be prevented from having political activity. But, in future this activity will be channeled to the straight Khomeyniist path. The university officials will control the students in order to prevent any deviation with respect to official ideology.

Finally, in future, each university will be directed by a council presided over by a person named by the minister of culture and higher education. This person will be assisted by three believing and practicing Muslims, loyal to the regime, two students and an official.

As for the general direction of all the universities, it will be provided by the cultural revolution staff, consisting of the minister of culture and higher education, his deputy for research, a mollah representing the Qom theological university, five believing academics loyal to the Islamic revolution, three teachers and two students.

Rafsanjani and the Universities

Here is what the president of the Islamic Revolution thinks:

--On the mollahs' role in university education:

"The mollahs who have no scientific training in the Western sense given this term--training which, incidentally, is questionable in my opinion--will not teach the sciences. But teaching of the humanities will have to be considered their specialty, and in this field, their presence at the university will be of precious assistance."

--On the cultural revolution:

"We still have a long way to go before knowing exactly what we must do. It is in practice that we will find our way. But we must set to work without waiting and then, perhaps in the space of a year, the cultural revolution will become a reality."

--On Western pedagogy:

"Colonizing culture must be replaced by Islamic culture. In order to do so, must find a method. This requires a great deal of work."

--On the creation of university circles other than Islamic circles:

"In the name of Islam, everything that seems useful and necessary should be undertaken. But it is impermissible that others come to demand, in the name of tolerance, the same advantages as those accorded to the people who are fighting in the name of Islam. This is exactly as if they called for the creation of a communist parliament alongside the Islamic Parliament. They should be happy with their lot. They are tolerated in an Islamic country, they benefit from money from the taxpayer. They even express their non-Islamic ideas. They should not ask for anything more."

--On the admission of ideological opponents:

"We give them the opportunity to study, but under surveillance. Only those who have not taken up arms against us and who limit themselves to thinking differently will have this chance."

(Report compiled on the basis of articles published in Islamic press and particularly in:

OMIDE AYANDEH (a weekly newspaper), No 1, 24 February 1982,

ETELA'AT (a daily newspaper), 14 March 1982)

9380

CSO: 4619/102

WEST BANK, GAZA CENSORSHIP OF BOOKS, POETRY SCORED

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 7 Mar 82 pp 13, 20

[Article by Amos Elon: "Literary Censorship"]

[Text] A meeting with a book hunter who protects the territories' inhabitants from any bad verse.

In the office of the armed forces spokesman in Jerusalem, it has been possible for 2 weeks to view a thick file that contains, as much as can be verified, an updated collection of military orders that prohibit the distribution and handling of 1,100 books in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. This is the first time that such a compilation--in the Catholic church they referred to it as an "Index"--has been revealed to the public. The revelation was forced on the armed forces by the international scandal that continues to surround the censorship imposed by the People of the Book on books in the occupied territories. The revelation will probably put an end to the confusion and mystery that deliberately surrounded this subject so far because of bureaucratic inertia or just plain snafu. But the scandal will continue.

Up to now, when someone criticized the censorship of one book or another, on the subject of Bedouin poetry, gymnastics or the works of Ibn Khaldun, the historian of the Middle Ages, or Mahfuz or Hakim (the greatest modern Egyptian writers), the authorities responded by stating loudly "nothing of the kind," with cries of lies or by claiming that this is hostile propaganda and so on, but they never agreed to reveal the list of the books that are really forbidden. On one occasion, it was claimed that the censorship orders are presented at the post office or are routinely sent to "lawyers and accountants" on the West Bank, as though that was enough. On another occasion, it was said that the list was protected for security reasons.

The truth is probably more prosaic. The military government never bothered to keep an up-to-date list. Arbitrariness and lack of order often go hand in hand. In the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, there is no "official newspaper," but not publicizing a military order regarding an emergency does not detract from its legality. Up to now a Kafkaesque situation has taken hold in the territories. Books have been confiscated on the bridges and people were prosecuted or could have been prosecuted by the military for violating orders whose content was never brought to the attention of many in an orderly fashion, and

even the defense lawyers only learned about their existence after the fact, when a claim was presented to the military court. Two things can be learned from the file that is now presented at the office of the armed forces spokesman:

First, about the negligence that contributed to the scandal, which is apparently a constant characteristic of the arbitrary rule that governs through orders that are not subject to parliamentary oversight or appeal. Indeed, on 26 December 1976 an order was issued forbidding the distribution and handling of hundreds of innocent volumes on the subjects of gymnastics and grammar and books by Najib Mahfuz, Tawfik al-Hakim and Ibn Khaldun, along with hundreds of books of political and anti-Semitic agitation. What happened? The authorities claim now that it was a "mistaken" order that was amended by another order, which is also included in this instructive file. How? According to the authorities, two lists were randomly inserted together in the wrong place, a list of books that are "permissible" (how long has there been such a list? and why?) was mistakenly attached to a list of "forbidden" books.

It is possible that this is how it happened, but if there was a mistake here the censors made a great effort to commit an error; 1,123 of the books specified in the "mistaken" order are not edited in two consecutive lists, as is apparent from the government excuse, but are arranged in alphabetical order. Someone, with great deliberation, worked very hard on this order. Worse yet, someone, without a second's hesitation, signed it: "Joshua Bar-David, censor." It is not enough to say as the authorities say, "there was a mistake and it was amended." What does it mean "a mistaken order?" On the West Bank an order is the law. Thousands of orders are routinely issued in the territories. This case indicates something about the climate under which they are issued. It is easy to legislate on the West Bank, it is easy to forbid and it is easy to allow. It suffices to make a stencil.

Second, we learn from the "amended" order and from tens of orders that followed it and which are included in the file, which is allowed to be published now and which books are still forbidden in the territories. On 13 December 1981, the "index" included "Mein Kampf" by Hitler but not a few books of poetry and meditation, polemics, Muslim and Arabic history, literary criticism, geography and economics; among them are also included books about the armed forces by HA'ARETZ military correspondent Ze'ev Shiff and by Yigal Allon, who was deputy prime minister of Israel; "The Jew from Malta" by Christopher Marlowe (1554-1593); George Antonius' classic book "Arab Awakening," 1938; a biography of Herzl by Desmond Steward; and almost any important poetry book by any Palestinian poet that was published over the past 40 years. The poets especially are the black sheep of the censorship.

I am speaking with the military personality who is responsible for this index, trying to get out of him the criteria and considerations that guide him. This man, about 50, with a serious expression, is enveloped in secrecy: he can be interviewed on the condition that his name and identity are not mentioned (even though his occupation is strictly civilian); he can only be quoted by paraphrasing and not with quotation marks. Why? To increase the distance between him and the reader. Why is it important? It is very important, even though many people on the West Bank know him well. He is an orderly man, apparently pedantic, carefully dressed and not without a certain charm. In another transfiguration, maybe he was a local policeman or a tax clerk. When he is silent,

... thin lips are closed. When he speaks he tends to be drily sarcastic in the style of Kojak, but without his moral or political horizons.

According to him, the criteria are rather simple. Only anti-Semitic books or books that contain words of incitement against Israel are disqualified not, according to him, criticism of its policies, which is legitimate.

Where is the dividing line? Incitement means a call for the liquidation of the state, an attack on its national values, the preaching of terror, a sympathetic study of the ideology of the PLO or, for example, instruction in the preparation of explosives. Everything else is permitted. Books that have been published by the PLO, on the other hand, even if they deal with cookies or houseplants, are automatically disqualified.

What is the logic in this global disqualification? Maybe there is no logic to it. After all, the war is against certain books, and not against a publishing house. He has not thought about that contradiction so far but instinctively he is convinced he is right. Will the books of Iraqi or Libyan Government publications be disqualified? No. Why? So why was the drama of Christopher Marlowe from the 16th century, "The Jew From Malta," disqualified? Because already on the cover of that book it is stated: "We Jews are willing to be degraded like dogs but when we uncover our nails we bite," The Jewish protagonist is described as a man sinking in a sea of blood during a crazy act of poisoning and vengeance and he even leads astray members of his family at the end of the drama. All of this is very serious, according to the man, even without any relation to the work itself. But this is a classic work! In every good university they study it. The man's eyes are frozen in their sockets. The eyebrows rise in contempt. Classic? So anti-Semitism is also classic.

The man repeats and emphasizes that he definitely does not disqualify educational values. Why then was the distribution of the biography, "Herzl, the Man and the Artist" by Desmond Stewart banned? Not because of something that is written in the book but because of what is written on the back of the volume. Something very serious. The man looks in his file and reads, "know the enemy; the wisdom of this saying is clear to all...therefore there is no escape from a study of such research...the author reviews the basis of Zionism and its ties with imperialism...which brought about the plundering of Palestine." He closes his file with a bang. His face is again severe, the lips are closed. By what criterion was this book disqualified? He cannot mention a specific criterion but the section that he read, in his opinion, is capable of inciting; the task of censorship is to moderate and not to incite. He has no doubt that censorship contributes to the moderation of positions on the West Bank. Here, this book about the geography of the Middle East was disqualified because it does not mention Israel and because it says that "the borders of Palestine were not outlined by geographical and historical facts but according to colonialist Zionist arms." Isn't it true? Maybe, the man maintained, it is also possible that we killed Jews. The question is, what is the effect on the public of such a book. I decide not to ask him about the New Testament.

Also, the book by Yigal Allon on the armed forces was banned because of a foreword by the translator. The man looks again in his file and reads. There is inciteful material here unlike any other. Under no circumstances should anyone in Nablus be allowed to read such a foreword. It says that Allon's book "complains about Arab wisdom which in its manifestations is imbued with deep-rooted arrogance and aggression without limits." This book is better than any book... could have written about the intentions of Israel toward oppression and its plans to impose surrender on the Arab nation.

Maybe it is worthwhile to allow the reader to decide for himself between the wise and moderate text of Yigal Allon and this idiotic introduction? There was a slight cloud of discomfort on the face of the man with the index. From my question he concludes that I am not familiar with the secrets of the Arab mentality. He himself is very familiar with it. He has a second degree, according to what he says, in Arabic literature and language. Ze'ev Shiff's book "Israel's Security System" was also disqualified because of a poisonous introduction and an eye-opener slogan on its cover reading "All the Arab states serve as confrontation states to Israel." The diaries of Che Guevera, the Cuban revolutionary, are banned, but in this case the man with the index is not able to say why. Nothing is said about it in his thick file. He is sure that there was a good reason.

He cannot find in his papers the reasons for banning the book "Archeological Remains in Palestine and Jordan." He assumes that there was too much Palestine instead of Israel and this should not be allowed. On the other hand, with something like pride, he immediately finds the reason for banning Phillip Gillon's book (he is a member of the editorial board of the JERUSALEM POST) "I Am An Israeli Jew For A Palestinian State." The book itself would not have been banned, according to him, but in the introduction by the Egyptian publishing house, unacceptable things are said: "The new prime minister of Israel is a veteran terrorist," "The Jewish people always lived in fear and this caused them to be aggressive and to demand guarantees from those who frighten them. Therefore, they took over their land, barred their right to live, the same right that they themselves received, and denied them a homeland like they have."

This might be true, but who benefits when the Arabs read it? It benefits our enemies. Also, Moshe Dayan is quoted in the introduction, "If they will let us choose between peace and land, I will choose land plus the land." The man with the index laughs suddenly. This is good, this sentence of Moshe Dayan is good, the man says, and laughs. It sounds authentic enough but can we allow this to be published? It is clear that that is impossible.

The man turns to his file again. He is convinced that his reasoning is usually good. It is possible that he errs here and there, he modestly adds, but it does not matter. He is not the final authority, he has a supreme commander who is responsible for him and the literary censorship of the state of Israel. All his decisions are transmitted to the commander for approval. Their correspondence is here in the file, a few are even over the telex! No, under no circumstances do they ban literature! This is a smear that has been circulated in public as a result of the mistaken order of 1976 that was immediately corrected, but despite this the smears continue.

The man with the index does not have a very high opinion of the media. Why was the anthology by Ibrahim Khalil, "The New Poetry in Jordan," banned? Because the following poem by Fadwa Tuqan was included: "This land is like a woman [with cheeks and a womb] the secret of fertility is one [the power of the secret] which grows corn and bees will grow a nation of fighters."

This sentence regarding the land that will grow a nation of fighters disturbs him. He twice repeats that it disturbs him a lot. Why is it forbidden to distribute and handle the books of almost all the Arab Israeli poets on the West

Bank or at least those that are important among them--Samih al-Qasim, Mahmud Darwish, Rashid Husayn or Tawfik Ziad?

To all appearances, the explanation is simple. They all write inciteful poems and a call to revolution that cannot be tolerated: The file is full of reports and quotations. Samih al-Qasim writes about the "razor blade" that screams in his veins, "The veins will accumulate bread and jasmin," or on "The Palestinian Goliath" who stands on the battlefield and cries "Of which shot do you speak...I am still alive." The man with the index thinks that this poem calls for the liquidation of Israel. This is how he interprets it. Or the well-known poem by Mahmud Darwish, that every Arab boy in Israel and maybe now in the territories too knows by heart: "It is written /I am an Arab/the number on my card is 50,000/and my child 8.../I am a name without a surname/with patience of steel.../. If I will starve/I will eat the flesh of my robbers/beware.../beware.../of my hunger."

This is a nice poem, the man with the index says. He willingly admits it. But this poem is dangerous. Why? It incites. How? Again a slight cloud of uncertainty returns to the man's features. He is amazed by my question. He wonders if we really live in the same society. It is clear that the poem perpetuates hatred toward us, and this is still not its worst feature. These poets encourage subversive elements that are opposed to peace, encourage sabotage and harm national values and our military interests. According to the man who is in charge of the index, they, in reality, are bloodthirsty.

I ask him if he read Bialik. He is a bit startled. Suppose yes, he says with a certain anger. "The City of Death?" No, I said, and this: "This is not because our distress is great/ If you made us into beasts of prey/ and with wrathful cruelty/ your blood we will drain, we shall not have mercy." Yes, says the man with the index, but this was intended against hooligans in the Ukraine! This is all right. They can recite this as much as they like in Judea and Samaria, this we willingly allow. But if it is against me, this is something else. We are obliged to ban such a poem. Such a poem can be dangerous.

Is this not the quality of almost all "national poetry" at a certain stage? The man ponders a moment about this possibility. Maybe. Still we are obligated to fight it. Does he really believe that it is possible to fight poetry? Certainly. When and where was it successful in the past? Maybe it did not succeed in any place up to now but we are trying to change history, he says. He will be the first.

This inquisition believes in itself. This man believes that through literary censorship people and ideas can be changed. It is a duty to ban certain books. Even from his point of view, won't this boomerang? The moment Mahmud Darwish poems are banned, won't everyone try to obtain them underground? The fact is that they are easy to obtain in East Jerusalem, which is a part of Israel. They are sold freely to whomever wants them. The man says that it is not his business, he is only in charge of the West Bank. There it is certainly useful to ban books. He suggests that I ask the chief of police if it is useful to ban books.

The one who governs looks like the one being governed. He has no doubts on this score. He has no problems of conscience. All of a sudden he speaks rapidly. He saw the list of books that are disqualified through censorship in Jordan. He assures me that it is very similar to ours.

I will be surprised when I see it. He is not the only anti-Semite in this region, he declares. I decide not to doubt it; I thank him and leave.

9944

CS0: 4423/162

NEEDS, PERCEPTIONS OF ISRAELI ARABS ANALYZED

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 22 Apr 82 p 10

[Article by Jalal Abu-Tu'mah: "Israeli Arabs Are Interested in Joining in Integration"]

[Text] Among the practical matters of daily life that arise from time to time and that concern a large part of the public is the question of the status and function of Israeli Arabs in Israel's daily life.

There is no doubt that the achievement of the peace treaty with Egypt, the withdrawal of the armed forces from the Sinai and events in the occupied areas naturally get most of the attention and lessen the interest in Israeli Arabs.

In the years of the country's existence, two central forces guide the Arab population in Israel: the first, the State of Israel, which stamped the strong seal of a democratic society on them through ideas and the economic structure; and opposite, the Arab states, with particular vigor after the end of military rule and the Yom Kippur war, in which the Arab states surprised the armed forces: These events produced a new feeling about the capabilities and potential of the Arab states and undermined the delicate balance that had existed in the past.

In the past they focused incessantly on the subject of the divided soul of the Israeli Arab as an Arab national and a citizen of the State of Israel. Although this is a practical question even now, the Israeli Arab wants the divisions to end. The many changes that have taken place in the life of the Arab population since the establishment of the state are significant.

Ninety-eight percent of Arab villages are connected to the electricity network. More than 95 percent of the villages are connected to the national road network. Infant mortality is down to a zero percentage, similar to the Jewish population. These and other data are impressive, but today Arab society is interested in real and actual integration into the life of the society and the economy. Today, it is not enough to wave these data and to say we did this and that, just as no intelligent person will compare the life of those from the Oriental community in the transient camps at the beginning of the state to the present period. One should concentrate on real and actual efforts for a suitable integration of the Israeli Arab population, which numbers approximately 700,000 people.

Although the Alignment government did not do much toward solving the practical problems of the Arab population, the Likud Government almost completely ignores the Arab segment. Toward the end of the Alignment rule, in the government of Yitzhak Rabin, the government conducted a few deliberations on the subject of the Israeli Arabs, which resulted in the appointment of 10 Arab academics to government offices. And people like Allon and Dayan, who served in the Alignment government, were well acquainted with the Arab population, whereas in the Likud Government no one is familiar with what is occurring in the Arab population--with the exception of Knesset Member Amnon Lin, whose voice in the Likud is like a "voice calling in the wilderness."

The Arab population has exhausted employment possibilities for the young people who are finishing their high school education. High school graduates are not being employed in their villages since there are no industrial enterprises, with the exception of confections, a source of employment for many women. Cultivated farm land is used to full capacity by their parents, with no alternative for tens of thousands of young people who go to work every morning in the neighboring Jewish settlements and in the large cities--in construction, industry, agriculture, services and other work. There is no doubt that industrialization of the Arab population where desirable and skilled work can be found will ease unemployment among the Arabs.

For that reason, the Ministry of Education should emphasize vocational education in the junior and senior high schools to train skilled manpower, which is lacking in the Arab population. At present, 10 percent of the Arab students get vocational and agricultural training, compared with 60 percent of the Jewish population.

Today, 5,000 Arab students study in teachers colleges and universities in Israel and abroad. In the past there was a great need in the Arab population for many teachers; today there is a surplus in that area. Many academicians cannot find employment in the profession they studied, and to their distress they are forced to work in jobs that are below their capabilities. The limited employment opportunities for academicians in the Arab population could create agitation as long as the government, the Histadrut, economic organizations and private Arab plans take responsibility for solving the problem [as published]. This, when every year the young rush to academic studies in professions such as law and medicine, which were vital in the Arab areas, but which are expected to be "seriously closed" in the not-too-distant future.

Besides the ineffectuality of the government in encouraging sources of industrial employment in the Arab population one should not forget the objections of private employers toward the absorption of Arabs because of imaginary security reasons, which actually have nothing to do with security. The next few years will pose a series of meaningful tests to the state and Israeli society in this area. Today, one can find educated Arabs teaching in universities in Bir-Zayt, Ramallah, and in Al-Najah college in Nabulus, it is doubtful if this makes the Israeli Government happy.

The central role of municipal governments in the Arab area was always greater than in the Jewish settlements. Since there are no other public institutions,

the local government in the Arab village has jurisdiction that has enabled it to gain a special status, unlike that in the Jewish settlements. The limited financial resources of this government, compared to that of its Jewish counterpart, incomparably increases the feeling of deprivation and discrimination among the village inhabitants and elected officials.

A study of the budgets of two municipal authorities, Jewish and Arab, with the same number of inhabitants, discloses the great gap in their revenues and government grants. Even if the municipal tax collection system became more efficient and the rate of collections multiplied, the condition of the local Arab authorities would not improve much.

The page is too short to detail all the areas in which Israeli Arabs complain about deprivation. The Arab population receives smaller grants from National Insurance compared with the Jewish population. The time has come to decide on granting a one-time financial allowance to those who complete their full military service. The mortgages that are given to young couples require a reasonable balance. Many places of employment that are not security-related are closed to Israeli Arabs.

The results of the last Knesset elections, in which the Labor Party received 50,000 votes from Arabs, do not indicate "love" for the Labor Party or hate of the communists and the radicals, but a displeasure with the Likud Government and all that is connected with the Arab population. Israeli Arabs see in the Labor Party the lesser of two evils, even though the Arab population has been disappointed by it in gaining suitable representation for its institutions.

Since the death of Knesset Member Abdul Aziz (Zuwaybi) of Mapam, more than 10 years ago, the Zionist parties have not had the wisdom to cultivate Arab activists in their midst who could gain the trust of the Arab population. The Zionist parties and the hierarchy of the Labor Party cultivated heads of families and colorless public officials who have become an eyesore to the Arabs. Since the death of MK (Zuwaybi), none of the other Arab Knesset members gained the same status as he did. He knew how to express the balance between his loyalty to his people and to his Israeli citizenship. Everyone loved him, Jews and Arabs; people like him could serve as a true bridge for increasing the understanding between the two nations. The Zionist parties should find and cultivate people with some influence in the Arab sector who would properly express what troubles the Arab population.

With completion of the withdrawal of the armed forces from the Sinai, the focus of attention in the Near East moves to the Palestinian problem. The public at large follows the identification between the Israeli Arabs and their brothers in the territories. As the Jews of the world identify with the struggle of their brothers in the Soviet Union, so the Israeli Arabs are not cut off emotionally from their brothers in the territories. The Israeli Arabs see the state as an existing fact that cannot be shattered.

Israeli Arabs receive quite an inspiration from the "Peace Now" movement, Gush Emunim, the movement for stopping the retreat from Sinai and Rabbi Meir Kahane's movement.

The more the government overlooks the problems of the Arab population, the more the difficulties will increase in the future. It is the government's duty to hold a comprehensive and exhaustive discussion of this problem, in all of its ramifications.

On the 35th anniversary of the Israeli state, Arabs note the advances and prosperity that they have attained during the years of the state's existence. The contributions of Israeli Arabs to the economy, especially in the agricultural area, are impressive. Their hope is that along with the peace with Egypt, greater attention will be given to their joining in the life of the state with greater involvement in many more areas.

9944

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ARIDOR'S MANAGEMENT OF FINANCE MINISTRY DISCUSSED

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 2 May 82 p 9

[Article by Shlomo Ma'oz: "Aridor as Supreme Ruler"]

[Text] Finance Minister Yoram Aridor is well aware of the power he has amassed in the last 15 months as the Likud government's third finance minister, and he has no intention of giving up the position that he captured for himself both in the public and in the party. In contrast to his predecessors, the present minister is not satisfied with fuzzy thinking or speeches lacking foundation; the integrity of work and in-depth thinking that he requires of himself he also requires of those who come into contact with him.

This will to perfection compels him to devote long hours to reading, study and thinking about the material presented to him. Yoram Aridor is strict about format, careful thinking and well-founded argumentation. If at the beginning there were officials who presented their ideas by heart or in casual documents, today every official, senior and junior alike, must present his ideas in writing. Minister Aridor declared unequivocally to his workers that he is open to new ideas and they are invited to present ideas to him, but he is under no obligation to adopt them if they are contrary to his way of thinking or political approach.

Most of the decisions today in finance are, in fact, made by the Seden-Aridor staff. Administrative sessions at the Ministry are shorter, and there is no raising of general financial policy matters, which are fashioned by the minister and the general director of his office, Prof Uzra Seden. Generally, at the ministry sessions, predefined issues are raised--specific issues are raised for discussion by the officials involved in them. Yoram Aridor does not give his OK to his workers to act only on the basis of his theoretical economic understanding. He is aware of political limitations and the influence of the voter, and he is therefore ready to continue supporting a financially ailing plant, at least for the short term, so as not to have its workers fired.

The Minister's Policy and Budget

The finance minister allocated slices in the current budget to those who asked that they not have to arouse more opposition to policy in the government. Allocations were also received by the Ministries of Communication and Tourism; a budget increase, and not the smallest for Avraham Sharir's Ministry of

Tourism, accompanied many discussions. At the Ministry of Finance they tell how they managed to "turn around" the general director of the Ministry of Tourism, Rafi Farber, who came to the meetings unprepared and with insufficient information. But the finance minister is not trying to cut the budgets intended for industry because of the loyalty of the officials of the Ministry of Industry and the experience amassed by Minister Gideon Patt. Every decision affecting industry, and likewise decisions on general economic matters such as subsidies and money market policies, arrive first for discussion at the minister of industry echelon. Because of a lack of interest displayed by Minister of Agriculture Simcha Ehrlich in what goes on in his ministry, the budget branch is involving itself more and more in the agricultural sphere and even determines policy in this area. Only when the minister of finance tried, in the course of the discussion of the budget for 1982, to accuse the Ministry of Agriculture of extorting additional allocations beyond those agreed upon, did Deputy Prime Minister Simcha Ehrlich go to war and succeed in defeating the Aridor arguments. Since then, relations between the ministries have quieted down, but Finance continues to involve itself in what goes on in Agriculture, possibly because of the agricultural background of the general director of Finance, who is responsible for the budget department.

Yoram Aridor still involves himself in bond matters. He has instructed his appointee in charge of insurance and the money market, Dr Ben 'Ami Tzuckerman, not to authorize new bond issues by banks or mortgage banks, except with his prior authorization. In Dr Tzuckerman's department they do not agree with this intervention by the government in the money market, but they carry out the minister's instructions. And not only that, but the minister of industry has also been given authority to disallow bond issues by nonindustrial companies on the Tel Aviv stock market.

Loyalty is not a dirty word at Finance. The loyalty of spokesman David Bar Haim to the general director of finance and the assistance that he gave him all the way, even while Professor Seden was still director of the economic planning authority, earned Bar Haim the post of deputy director general for special missions. In this capacity, he is one of the heads of Finance who participate in the administrative sessions that are held every Friday. The finance minister also rewards those who are loyal to him and the members of his party. He appointed his advisor, Haim Hacham, director general of El-Al's daughter corporation TShT [expansion not given]. He quickly promoted Herut activist and diamond entrepreneur Nahman Perl to the post of chairman of the board of directors of El-Al, and since then the minister has been more supportive of El-Al's interests. Israel Arkin, former director of the budget department, really did not deserve the post of director general of Israel Chemicals, because Gideon Patt had requested it for the director general of his ministry who resigned, Yoram Ziv, but instead of this he got the position of director general of Egrevsco, an appointment that will become effective shortly. Deputy Director of the Income Tax Department Abraham Tzorfat, who displayed talent and loyalty, and who is associated with Likud, was appointed second in command of income tax and stands to inherit Dov Neiger's position. A Herut activist from Lod was appointed second in charge of state service. Attorney Israel Picol, active in the Herut movement, was appointed economic representative in New York. Uri Oren, David Levy's former assistant and also

Aridor's spokesman for several months, was appointed spokesman for Israel's economic mission in New York. Azriel Waldman, who was director general of the Ministry of Absorption under Minister David Levy, was appointed director of the government corporations authority after the ministry was given to Tami.

Yoram Aridor remembers and stands at the vigil. After the dismissal of the head of the Bank of Israel and his second-in-command, he recently brought about the dismissal of the appointee in charge of foreign currency matters at the Bank of Israel, Moshe ben Uzzielio. The dismissal was carried out via Dr Moshe Mandelbaum. The minister of finance did not approve of the fact that Ben Uzzielio did not read correctly the inflation map that he desired.

The Deputy in Charge of "Our People"

Deputy Minister of Finance Haim Kaufman does not try to stand out alongside his superior. He does the day to day work among the supporters of the Herut movement and navigates the political pressures. Kaufman gets involved in decisions that might hurt "our people" or might weaken Likud's power. It is in the nature of things that the area of political appointments is closer to MK Haim Kaufman, who also serves as a kind of finance minister's ambassador to the Knesset and its committees. MK Kaufman does not take part in the area of regular economic decisions, but, under the instructions of the finance minister, he does get involved in matters of fiscal legislation. Other matters that the minister transferred to Kaufman were market interest rates and credit for diamond entrepreneurs.

While MK Kaufman takes care of the political side, public matters are entrusted to a large staff of experts. Nahman Perl, chairman of the El-Al board of directors, loaned Yoram Aridor Arnold Sherman, who spends several days a week in the finance minister's office. Appointed as personal spokesman was Benny Friedman who jumped directly from government spokesman in the north to communications in economics. Also serving the finance minister is deputy director of the treasury and treasury spokesman David Bar Haim. Serving as close economic advisors are former transportation minister Gideon Siterman and Dani Derekh. Despite this large staff of advisors, Yoram Aridor still relies mainly on himself, and when he reacts to Histadrut actions or gives a public speech, he generally drafts the text himself.

The Meridor Ministry

At Finance they treat the economic ministry with mercy. At first they transferred to Meridor's authority the economic planning authority that Professor Seden had headed when he came to the Ministry of Finance. Ideas were raised that the Ministry of Economic would outline a way to increase the efficiency of the Ministry of Education or possibly become more involved in the water canal project--or that it would examine the reduction of study years to just 11 by considering the possibility of doing away with the 12th year. But everyone quickly came to understand that the minister of economics had no intention of dealing with long-range programs and that he was incapable of setting up a government ministry. Twenty-four workers were placed at his disposal, but half of them dropped out because they did not want to sit for a long time with

nothing to do. Even before the breakdown, Mrs Ruth Leventhal worked with the director general of finance, Professor Seden, and he appointed her as his close advisor. Now the ministry is still functioning under the leadership of Yaacov Meridor--though modestly, perhaps because of the negative echoes accompanying the "discovery of the wheel"--on projects involving convalescent tourism and general medical tourism and the means of financing these projects.

Since the entry of Arye Ganger to the ministry, most of the projects are concentrated in his hands. Even people outside the Ministry of Economics, including people at Finance, praise Arye Ganger and describe him as a man who knows his job. It is not clear exactly what Ganger is doing, but it seems that he hopes to apply his wide business experience in the United States to Israel, especially to suitable methods of financing long-term projects that Israel wants to develop. Now, when a feeling of rejuvenation prevails at the economics ministry because of the participation of Ganger, they are trying to get rid of the Finance people who were left behind. These are veteran experts in their fields who are now being told that neither Finance nor, of course, Economics, has any use for them. The minister of economics has told the finance minister that he is returning the experts that Finance sent him. David Brodet, who served as deputy director of the Economics Planning Authority and opposed Mrs Leventhal, is now looking for a job in another ministry. Another deputy, Zeev Ellenbogen, an expert in the energy field, has been out of work since September.

State Income Administration

The concentration of power in the hands of Professor Seden is also influencing the State Income Administration. Dr Yosef Gabai, for whom the first commission was named that examined the subject of taxation during inflation, still hopes to be appointed official in charge of state income despite the fact that his prospects are weak. The rest of the officials in the administration are out of work, apart from Asher Arin, who is now subordinate to the director general of finance as the official in charge of direct taxation and the director of the research department in the administration, and Yoram Gabai, the official in charge of indirect taxation, who is also directly subordinate to Seden. The position of Sarah Shvid, who has taken many official junkets abroad, has not been challenged, and she is now serving in Jamaica as judicial advisor to the State Income Administration.

In the income tax department, considerable bitterness prevails because of the jumping of Dr Yitzhaq Sviri to the position of professional deputy to the head of income tax. Sviri, in fact, was borrowed from the Bank of Israel and in just a few months has managed to concentrate in his own hands the issue of inflationary taxation by circumventing senior officials in the department. His excessive concentration on the matter of inflationary taxation, for which and to divert criticism he has enlisted his friend Dr Amir Barnea from the University of Tel Aviv, has resulted in the neglect of the matter of economic counselling. The professional department at the head of which Sviri was placed cannot and does not suffice to answer all the appeals of assessment officialdom, and thus a bottleneck has been created that has caused blind unemployment among tax officials. Some workers openly opposed Sviri's concentrationist plan, but at this stage Sviri is firmly in control since he enjoys the support of the

minister of finance and the knowledge that he can always return to the Bank of Israel. Now, a few months after assuming the position, Sviri has already taken advantage of the opportunity and travelled to Jamaica, to Sarah Shvid, to discuss the matters of double taxation--a trip that income tax head Dov Neiger requested, according to officials at Finance.

Professor Seden is aware of the controversy between the two branches of the tax department and does not prevent them from competing among themselves in the levying of taxes. The director of customs, Mordekai Barqat, who has risen far from the bottom of the ladder, is doing dull necessary work and succeeded last year in levying the value added tax, to the satisfaction of the finance minister. The director of the income tax division, Dov Neiger, did not measure up to the expectations of the Finance administration last year, which has perhaps weakened his position. In any case, at Finance there is no intention of amalgamating the departments--as several commissions in recent years have recommended. This, perhaps, because of the knowledge that competition among the branches increases the tax levy.

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NAVY HURT BY DEFENSE BUDGET REAPPORTIONMENT FOR LAVI

Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 5 May 82 p 4

[Article by Alex Fishman: "The Defense Budget--Not a Cut But a Reapportionment"]

[Text] On the day the government made its final announcement about production of the Lavi plane in Israel, naval staff officers had no reason to celebrate. It was clear to senior naval officers that the infusion of resources from the defense budget to the Lavi project marked the end of development programs, conceptions and intentions in everything concerning the build-up of the naval arm in the coming decade. More than that, from a sober analysis of the intentions of defense department higher-ups, they began to suffer from a dim fear that it was doubtful if the naval arm would be able to maintain its present strength over the coming decade.

The gloomy atmosphere that prevailed did not abate after the declaration by the defense minister (delivered, surprisingly, a short time after the announcement of the development of the Lavi) that the navy would work on the development of a missile boat; it only rubbed salt on the wound. The defense minister had his say, and the public was left to understand that after the defense budget cuts on the one hand and the expected unit development costs of the Lavi on the other, the IDF would continue to develop and that even the navy merited new equipment and would grow and renovate.

It should be obvious that the tighter things are, the more difficult are the financial problems, and they cannot be solved with nonsense or a blurring of facts. The reapportionment of the defense budget according to the directives of defense minister Ariel Sharon will have far-reaching consequences beyond the developments as presented by the heads of the defense establishment. On purpose we use the term "reapportionment" of the defense budget and not, as the defense minister likes to present it, a budget cut. From the data available today, we can deduce that the attractive power of the defense budget has not suffered, and that it is worthwhile to wait until the end of the budget year to see the final balance.

As noted, the reapportionment of the defense budget will have far-reaching consequences on the buildup of power over the long term. It is proper, therefore, to present at least some of these. We might have used examples taken from the ground forces, but it is convenient for purposes of discussion to use the third arm, the navy, because this arm, since its establishment, has never enjoyed

precedence. On the contrary, as is happening this time, it has generally paid the price of financial reorganizations of the defense establishment.

If we accept the assumption that the possibility exists that another confrontation will break out in the region in the future, at some point, then the growth or buildup of forces must be free of the current situation assessment, whether it be a political one or a concrete intelligence one. Correspondingly, the navy continues to be subordinate to the historical purposes that were established for it by orders: defense of the country's coasts, assistance to the ground forces, the securing of vital shipping. The defense minister is permitted and required to direct the navy and define how he sees the accomplishment of these missions and what the order of preferences should be in light of his policy. As far as is known, the present defense minister has done so, and his way of going about things was laid out. It was determined, for example, that the navy would do what it can to prevent the paralysis of vital shipping to Israel, the navy would prevent the enemy from using naval weapons against Israeli ground targets and, following from that, a long series of missions. If so, how is the Israel Navy to build itself up to accomplish these difficult missions that were imposed on it in the face of developments in its opponents' navies?

Since the possibilities for diversification in ships and quantities of ships are limited, a number of concepts have developed in recent years concerning the future nature of the navy. Some have argued for the establishment of a navy composed primarily of submarines. The "minimalists" have favored a navy that would lean mainly on small ships carrying sophisticated armament, at the expense of sophisticated equipment for electronic warfare and target discovery. The accepted concept was that in light of the expected developments in the arena, the navy needs large missile ships of the Saar class that are well-known today--large platforms that would be able to carry equipment for electronic warfare, passive equipment for the defense of the boat, without relinquishing the carrying capacity of armament sufficient to meet the requirements of modern naval warfare.

This concept was expressed in the demand of the navy for a missile ship for the coming decade of the Saar type. This "minimalist" approach was fed by the fact that from the lessons of past wars and from an analysis of the arena, there is a basic assumption that the weight of the naval arm in deciding a campaign is small and that its contribution does not justify the construction of a large expensive navy. Most of the battle would take place along Israel's coast, and therefore vessels suitable for that would have to suffice. This approach contradicts that of the navy heads when they describe expected battlefield developments.

Ninety-nine percent of Israel's foreign trade passes through the Mediterranean. Of this total, 60 percent is carried on Israeli flag ships, which constitute a target for the enemy. Relative to other states in the area, this is a rather impressive statistic. By way of comparison, 98 percent of Egypt's foreign trade passes through the Mediterranean, but only 30 percent is carried on Egyptian flag ships. When we look at the Mediterranean arena, it is clear that anyone who wants to reach Israel must pass close to the coasts of Israel's enemies. The distance from Libyan and Algerian ports to the central lanes that lead to

Israel is, at certain points, only 50-150 miles. These international lanes are fixed and it is possible to track Israeli ships, to report their movements, to estimate their speed and, with such advance preparation, it is also possible to hit them at any time. The question being asked is: Does a country like Libya intend or is it able to sink a ship in a lane and in a region in which the U.S. Sixth Fleet and the Soviet Navy sail?

There seems to be a division of opinion about this. There are observers who claim that there are signs that the Libyans and Algerians are preparing for the possibility of a strike against Israeli shipping (we will consider that in the continuation) and that they intend to carry out a strike of this sort. In the past there were reports about a Libyan decision to hit the civilian ship Queen Mary, and we know that they did not hesitate to go out and attack the Sixth Fleet. If it is accepted that a hostile country would make an effort to hit a vital shipping route through which passes most of the raw material and heavy war equipment for Israel, then there is room for debate about the building of a navy of ships capable of acting at long range and staying at sea for protracted periods to defend this route.

The budget policy of the defense minister has solved this dilemma without posing alternatives. That policy has pulled the rug from under the concept that has been gaining strength in the navy in recent years. The question is whether the navy in its present scope and condition is capable at all of carrying out the mission of defending the shipping lanes.

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COUNTRY IN DANGER OF LOSING EUROPEAN PRODUCE MARKET

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 7 May 82 p 19

[Article by Aharon Pri'el: "Israeli Agriculture in Crisis"]

[Text] Israeli agriculture is losing advantages that it gained for itself in the vital West European market over the past decade. Israel's agricultural export has lost its leading position and the preference that it had enjoyed for more than 10 years--a decade in which were harvested the fruits of the R & D of the first half of the sixties and which was characterized by the ability to implement pioneering research efforts and to integrate research and training into Israeli agriculture, so short on tradition.

During the past 10 years, the local agriculture sector was established and broadened and the foundation was established for creating fresh agricultural produce in great variety and in quantities that far exceeded the demand of the local population.

The solution was export--Israel penetrated the European markets with new products. The advantage of climate also contributed to the leading position that Israeli produce captured in the markets of Europe--in the Beqa and in the Arava, fruits and vegetables were grown to satisfy the demand from more than 3 million mouths in Western Europe, whose countries enjoyed, up until a year or two ago, large-scale accelerated economic development. The rate of unemployment there was low. The population had money to buy avocados, melons and flowers from Israel. Europe was "hungry"--and we came at the right time with the right product to the right place.

But after a while other countries in the Mediterranean basin with similar climatic conditions also began to exploit those advantages--plus the advantage of their geographical proximity to the consumers. More than that, the farmers of these areas inherited "partial victories" after they succeeded in acquiring, by hook or by crook, basic Israeli know-how.

The competition was fierce, but Israel's position did not deteriorate. We had one advantage left: an organized system of marketing by one company, EgrekSCO, that operated in all areas of agricultural export (including flowers, until 6 or 7 years ago when a Supreme Court ruling followed a High Court of Justice decision that enabled private exporters to export flowers) except citrus.

"The Israelis Are Stupid"

A senior official in EgrekSCO, among the company's veterans and experts, who knows his way around the West European market, told me: "We set up a model system of agricultural export; we set up an organized, efficient and sophisticated marketing system. And then what happens? Without being required to by any objective factors in Europe, we ourselves destroyed our own handiwork. Why? Because of complacency or an incorrect reading of the map in the markets of Europe; because of games of give and take among government ministers; because of politicization in the mapping of key positions in EgrekSCO and production councils; because of stinginess in the allocation of resources for agricultural research, which is vital in enabling us to continue to be exclusive in several products at least for a period of 5 years until our competitors can decipher the genetic code of the hybrid melon and tomato seeds; because of wild competition, especially among the flower growers."

All of these, he added, strike at organized export and marketing to the point of causing crises--and the merchants in Holland and Germany rub their hands with delight and rack up comfortable margins in the price war between the Israelis and themselves. These merchants say: "If the Israelis are so stupid they deserve it!"

Prof Gad Lubenshteyn, chief scientist in the Ministry of Agriculture and head of the Agricultural Research Administration, used more delicate terms in describing the current crisis in agriculture and agricultural export. He had already warned some time back about the growing crisis in the export markets and called for the development of new products capable of providing the growers with high profits; he is working to increase the level of the harvests in citrus and avocado and to move to sea transport of fresh produce. Upon his appointment as head of the agricultural administration, Professor Lubenshteyn sought to give preference to agricultural research that would be able to meet the challenge of the new situations. He is still trying. About 2 weeks ago, in a meeting with members of the agricultural committee of the Knesset touring [the Vulcan] center in Bet Dagan, Professor Lubenshteyn said that he lacks 140 million shekels needed to give agricultural research the ability to confront the new conditions that we will face in 5 or 10 years.

Professor Lubenshteyn warned of the entry of Spain into the Common Market, "which is likely to cause serious difficulties in the import of fresh and processed produce from Israel to the countries of the Common Market"; he revealed that Saudi money, in quantity, has been encouraging the expansion in Spain of Israeli prestige crops--as a means of economic warfare against Israel.

"This fact, in addition to the increasing competitive capability of other countries of the Mediterranean basin such as southern Italy, Morocco, Egypt and Greece, is likely to cause a considerable reduction in the marketing of fresh fruits and vegetables from Israel."

A 20-Percent Reduction in Export

Professor Lubenshteyn says explicitly: "The agricultural research institutions must find professional answers to the possibility of reductions in the export

of fresh produce, and there is, therefore, the need for a concentration of effort on the development of new areas of export that will enable Israel to compete in the European market--increasing the production of seeds and reproductive materials and the development of new plants for fresh export, such as new sub-tropical flowers, condiments and medicinal herbs."

Professor Lubenshteyn says that in the near future a decrease in Israel's water quality is to be expected. This phenomenon is likely to cause serious damage, especially to two of Israel's principal export items--the avocado and citrus. In a memo that he presented to members of the economic committee of the Knesset, Professor Lubenshteyn proposed instituting changes in the makeup of the Moshav farming economy, which is subject to a serious economic crisis, and also planning for substitute animal feed in light of the fact that Israel is today importing the equivalent of \$35 million per year in fodder.

Economists in the Ministry of Agriculture believe that if a shot of encouragement is not given now to agricultural research, to provide Israel the advantage it needs to compete in the markets of Europe, it will result, "as much as the term now seems exaggerated, in the collapse of Israeli agriculture. People have forgotten that agriculture in Israel is not simply a business, it is a way of life; it is also a sign of a productive society. Agriculture is also secure borders and the main tenancy of land in the hands of its rightful owners."

In other words, many agricultural settlements, especially new moshavs and those that are not yet consolidated from an economic or social point of view, will crumble. Also, kibbutzim, in which agriculture constitutes the principal branch, are likely to be hurt. Signs of a future crisis can already be seen.

"Agricultural export is likely to be reduced this year by about 20 percent, and instead of girding ourselves to overcome the sectoral-political-party squabbles and power plays between the Ministries of Agriculture and Finance, the agricultural administration and the settlement movements, each side is digging in to defend its position. These are games at the expense of the farmers of 'who can hold out the longest' in a war of attrition between the Ministry of Agriculture and the agricultural center," I was told by a senior official in the Ministry of Agriculture.

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LEBANON

WASHINGTON'S VIEWS ON LEBANESE ELECTIONS ANALYZED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 258, 30 Jan 82 pp 26-27

[Article by Ghassan Bayram]

[Text] President Jlyas Sarkis has become completely convinced that the only role he can play during the few remaining months of his term of office is to share in the "cooking" of the battle for the presidency of the republic.

President Sarkis sees no other role for him to play at this time, especially as far as the Lebanese crisis is concerned, because the meeting of the Committee for the Arab Continuation that was not held at the ministerial level on 18 January 1982 was for the Lebanese president the last remaining Arab opportunity to place great hopes on the possibility of benefitting from it and for successfully resolving the Lebanese crisis in a practical way.

At any rate, the disappointment at the loss of this opportunity was no greater than the disappointment which the Lebanese president feels because he senses that the United States is not taking any step or practical initiative to share in resolving the complexities of the Lebanese crisis.

Only those closely associated with the Lebanese president know how much sadder he is these days than at any other time in the past because his term is close to ending without any progress having been made toward a genuine resolution of the Lebanese crisis.

President Sarkis who has been constantly complaining throughout the second half of his term that no one wants to help resolve the crisis and that all the parties take turns in putting obstacles in the way of his efforts to find a solution. Nor does he now allow an occasion to pass without placing on the main parties concerned and their activities responsibility for not helping him.

A few days ago, a prominent person and friend of President Sarkis said: "Your Excellency, to speak of what is past is a waste of time, for, as the proverb says, what is past is dead. I will not argue or debate responsibilities and lost opportunities, what and who is responsible for

losing them. I would rather speak to you about the present and the remaining months of your term."

The friend continued: "While it is true that the government could not have done anything to escape from some aspects of the ordeal during the last few years, at this time, however, it is not true that you are no longer able to do anything during the 5 or 6 months you will still be in office because you can do a great deal. And if you do, you will undoubtedly render a service to your country that it will remember and record."

President Sarkis listened very attentively to these words and then asked: "What can I do now that I am at the end of my commitment?"

The friend who occupies a preominant place in the world of finance and economy answered: "What you can do is work to elect a new president of the republic to succeed you under normal circumstances in a way to ensure the transfer of power amidst all the external manifestations required by democratic traditions and customs."

President Sarkis said: "Right, the election of a president is the most important reward awaiting us. In fact, I can do a great deal in this regard. I know the real meaning of this role which awaits me and I shall perform it as my conscience dictates."

President Sarkis added: "But I am disturbed at the probability there will be no agreement on a presidential candidate, which increases the difficulty of the problems in a way that affects the security situation and makes it impossible to have the election at the appointed time."

The president attached great importance to mutual Syrian-Phalangist understanding on the presidential battle, saying: "When I say I am working for a Syrian-Phalangist dialogue to achieve mutual understanding, I am not doing that because I love the Phalangists or because I am partial to them, as it pleases some to say or think. Rather, it is because I am motivated by the Lebanese national interest, for without Syrian-Phalangist understanding regarding the presidential election, it might be difficult if not impossible to hold the election in a natural atmosphere and with good will and harmony prevailing among all. No, in fact I am doubtful about this possibility. This is what I fear and I do not know where this vacuum will lead us."

The friend replied: "This is true, Your Excellency. No one can question the importance of bringing about mutual Syrian-Phalangist understanding regarding the presidency of the republic that would contribute to the possibility of electing a new president under normal circumstances. But I should like to ask: If it proves impossible to achieve such a Syrian-Phalangist agreement, would that have to be the end of the world? Would we have to stand with arms folded and passive to the point where we come to a vacuum or something worse?"

He went on to say: "If Your Excellency failed during the last 5 years to achieve this mutual understanding and harmony between the Syrians and the

Phalangists, will you be able to achieve it in the remaining few months of your term of office? Don't you think you would have achieved it at the beginning if circumstances allowed? Given the situation in which you are in, Your Excellency can bring about this mutual understanding and harmony and through you they can be guaranteed to the new president. You are able to engage in a discussion with the Syrians, on the one hand, and with the Phalangists, on the other, and with other interested parties. Hence you are the intermediary through whom all these parties can talk and come to the new president on whose election they must agree. Is it necessary, for example, that Minister 'Abd al-Halim Khaddam meet with Shaikh Bashir al-Jumayyil to obtain an agreement on the new president? Of course, it isn't necessary as long as all these difficulties stand in its way and as long as your natural role is to achieve mutual understanding by your mediation and through you. This is the role in which you can render great service to your country."

President Sarkis concluded this conversation by saying: "Of course...of course, this is what I will do and support."

Some of those familiar with what goes on behind the scenes of a presidential campaign and with the way the game is played say the remarks and advice of this prominent political economist may not disturb President Sarkis personally as long as he continues to refuse an extension of his term and emphasizes over and over again that he is waiting impatiently for it to end so that he can go home after turning over this responsibility to his successor. But most certainly this talk will anger some important members of the government as well as some of the president's close associates who are now forming a working group urging an extension President Sarkis' term and they are planning to bring about all the political and security circumstances that will make all the parties concerned, however much they may differ among themselves, ultimately realize an extension is the best solution.

Some of the president's associates were basically the ones who first circulated a number of slogans in the presidential election campaign and which they try by various means to convince some Arab and foreign authorities of it. These slogans include, for example, "A president you know is better than a president you don't know" and "An experienced president is better than a president who has to be tested."

These are all the kinds of slogans that please Arab and foreign parties not now in a position to resolve the Lebanese crisis and elect a president to do so.

Perhaps the most important card that the "working group" is trying to play at the present time and that it regards as a winning card in the drive for an extension is the matter of detente between Syrians and Phalangists.

These persons and perhaps foreigners as well believe that continuing to voice slogans of mutual understanding between Syrians and Phalangists on the presidency of the republic through direct discussions between them is the best way to achieve an extension, is the best option and the easiest solution.

Hence "you dress up" this solution in the eyes of active and efficient foreigners and Arabs who are called or introduced in the Lebanese capital as the "great recruiters," i.e., those who determine the qualifications of a candidate and his name, define for him his role and duties, and place him before the "electors" in the Chamber of Deputies to announce his election officially.

Those among the leaders and Lebanese political groups who display antagonism and enmity toward the government and toward President Sarkis personally charge the government proclaims its refusal to extend the presidential term, on the one hand, and works for it, on the other. Those making such a charge rely mostly on saying that the plan already made requires the continued use of slogans calling for a dialogue and detente between Syrians and Phalangists as a means of ensuring the election of a new president and that without such mutual understanding this or that authority will proceed to contrive a security explosion in order to delay the election or at least exert the maximum political pressure to postpone the holding of a session of the Chamber of Deputies.

These leaders also charge the "association of beneficiaries of extension" with being behind the wave of threats of disasters that will result if a new president cannot be elected at the constitutional time and of warnings of dangers and disasters during the transitional stage that will follow the vacuum caused by the vacating of the presidency without the presence of an elected president, despite the fact that important government officials and close associates of the president are aware of the circumstances and considerations that make it difficult, if not impossible, at the present time to bring together Syrian officials with Phalangist leaders around a table to discuss and confer about their slogan--mutual understanding on the election of a new president of the republic.

It appears that some American officials along with Arab and European authorities among those wary of and cautioning against impulsive steps and uncalculated risks began a little while ago to entertain the idea of extending President Sarkis' term for 2 years if a consensus candidate is unobtainable.

This is what led former Prime Minister Sa'ib Salam to bring up the subject from this standpoint with Charles Percy, chairman of the U.S. Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, when they met in the home of the American ambassador at his invitation.

In the course of a long conversation, Prime Minister Salam asked Senator Percy: "You say you support an extension of President Elias Sarkis' term. Is it true you are working for it?"...

Senator Percy found the question strange and answered with a denial: "Not at all...We are not working for an extension of the term of your president...at least according to my information. I do not know if our ambassador was instructed to this effect. I have no knowledge of it."

Senator Percy turned to Ambassador Dillon and asked: "Do you have instructions to work for an extension of President Sarkis' term?"

The ambassador answered: "No, I have no such instructions or knowledge that my government is working for that. On the contrary, whenever we asked President Sarkis, he said he refuses an extension and does not want to remain in office."

Sa'ib Salam commented: "It is natural for President Sarkis to say he doesn't want an extension whenever he is asked. It is also natural for him not to say "I want to remain and would like an extension." Yet what he does is the opposite of what he says. All I know is that your French friends and allies are the ones who are leading the campaign for an extension. Can they act in this fashion by themselves?"

Senator Percy was astonished and asserted that his country is not working for an extension. Ambassador Dillon asserted this too.

Be that as it may, these assurances by the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee concerning his country's attitude toward an extension of President Sarkis' term added more confusion to the situation in which the Lebanese presidential campaign is intertwined with political maneuvers of many kinds.

Some observers came to believe this as a result of their surprise over this rapprochement, for which there is no explanation for the American inclination toward the Lebanese presidency.

At a time when Philip Habib had already brought up the subject in the Lebanese capital and inquired about the possibility of an extension of President Sarkis' term as a likely possibility and way out of the crisis, there was Senator Percy affirming the opposite, saying his country is not working for an extension but favors securing the election of a new Lebanese president.

In the opinion of specialists on Lebanese presidential elections, this contradiction, if it shows anything, shows that the final decision has not yet been made and that the selection of a new Lebanese president is just one of the matters presented throughout and is still dependent on anticipated developments.

This belief was strengthened by the fact that some expected Lebanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Fu'ad Butrus in his talks with president Hafiz Assad and Minister 'Abd al-Halim Khaddam to touch on the presidential election and the Syrian attitude toward it and then set a time for a meeting between Presidents Hafiz al-Asad and Elias Sarkis one of the purposes of which would be to reach a mutual understanding on this matter.

But nothing of this kind happened and question marks remain over the basic attitudes of the main parties concerned toward the election, particularly those of Syria and the United States. This assures that the Lebanese

situation as a whole is still bound up with and hostage to developments expected to unfold in a few months. Accordingly, it is possible to define the qualifications and nature of the new president and determine whether he is to be a president for change or for more of the same.

Contrary to what many believe, informed Arab sources have said in the presence of some Lebanese politicians that this stage must not pass without benefitting from it by ending Lebanon's ordeal and taking a big essential step toward placing the Lebanese situation on the road to a true solution.

These Arab authorities are said to have adopted this view based on a number of known facts, for example, the inclination within the American administration to support a solution to the problem of Lebanon and the country's preservation has lately grown stronger and more significant. This was recently expressed by Secretary of State Alexander Haig in a public statement in which he said a solution to the problem of Lebanon is the key to the resolution of the regional crisis.

It also follows from these facts that any decision to strive for a solution that comes from some international powers, especially the United States, will find fertile soil in Lebanon because all the forces that had previously blocked efforts to find a solution are no longer as powerful as they once were, that is to say: all the forces involved in the struggle for Lebanese territory are now feeble and their power to resist and frustrate decisions and let opportunities pass by has definitely weakened and diminished. The Lebanese government can therefore take advantage of this opportunity and try to prod American diplomacy and urge it to work for a resolution of the Lebanese crisis that must come with a new president who enjoys the qualifications of courage and ability to make decisions, not to mention high moral standards, and possession of a clear vision for building and leading the new state.

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LEBANON

BUTRUS, AL-ASAD TALKS ON LEBANON ANALYZED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 258, 30 Jan 82 p 28

[Text] Syrian Foreign Minister 'Abd al-Halim Khaddam was meeting in his office in Damascus with his colleague Lebanese Foreign Minister Fu'ad Butrus when he received a telephone call from the Secretary General of the Arab League Chedli Klibi telling him that the shape of the Arab stand is still unclear, thus encouraging the idea of holding the meeting of Arab foreign ministers scheduled for next 7 February according to a Syrian suggestion. The Lebanese minister understood from the telephone conversation between Foreign Minister Khaddam and the Secretary General of the Arab League that Arab states headed by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait still have reservations about this date for the foreign ministers' meeting, which was originally designated for a discussion of Israel's annexation of the Golan Heights in the light of the debates that took place in the UN Security Council and ended with the United States vetoing the resolution imposing sanctions against Israel. After Minister Khaddam hung up, Minister Fu'ad Butrus said it appears that our Saudi and Kuwaiti brothers still have reservations concerning the new date for the foreign ministers' meeting. What is your opinion as head of the Arab League Council for this session? The Syrian and Lebanese ministers then plunged into a discussion about the possibility of postponement and other circumstances of the Arab stand on this matter. Minister Butrus summed up his impressions as follows:

- (1) The Arab situation is still not sufficiently ready for a stand to be taken on the question of the annexation of the Golan Heights, which is tantamount to an Israeli challenge and an extreme form of political and military provocation against the Arab World. It reflects a continuation of American support, despite all the surrounding circumstances and considerations.
- (2) The Arabs are still sharply disputing about what should be done in the foreign ministers' meeting regarding the United States' vetoing the punishment of Israel.
- (3) Syria will continue its efforts to hold the Arab foreign ministers' meeting at the appointed time of 7 February. However, the inclination to postpone it to a later date will not tempt Syria to start a fight against some of the Arab stands and, therefore, abandon the Arab exercise of the power of choice and policy of the Arab conferences.

(4) This is not the end of the Golan issue. Political pressures have not as yet exhausted all their objectives. In fact, there are possibilities and political pressures to which we haven't yet resorted.

However, Minister Khaddam went deeply and in great detail into many matters relating to the Lebanese situation and the Syrian role in Lebanon without pausing very long on the main purpose of this visit, namely, examination of bilateral relations between Lebanon and Syria.

But the reasons why the discussion went into detail in all other matters except this particular one remain obscure. There is an explanation that some informed sources have put forward and it relates to the old basic Syrian attitude, namely, Damascus is not ready to enter into any negotiations in depth with Lebanon that will deal with the conclusion of agreements and treaties to regulate economic, security, and political relations between the two countries under the pressure of any circumstance and in the absence of national harmony among the Lebanese. Although many important government officials do not criticize Syria for this formal attitude which President Hafiz al-Asad voiced on more than one occasion, those close to President Sarkis and Minister Butrus expressed the belief that the foreign minister did not find the atmosphere in Damascus conducive to pursuing the matter for many reasons, including the delicacy and sensitivity of the situation now prevailing in the area.

In evaluating the circumstances of the present stage and the seriousness of the situation prevailing in the area, Minister 'Abd al-Halim Khaddam in his conversation with Minister Fu'ad Butrus said the circumstances of the present confrontation demand that no hasty decisions likely to worsen the Lebanese situation be made because many things to be decided depend on the way the situation in the area develops. In his conversation with Minister Butrus, President Hafiz al-Asad spoke at great length about this aspect and was critical of the theory of a political solution to the Lebanese crisis as an indispensable option. President al-Asad said the area is facing the possibility of having to deal with some military solutions in the sense that the area crisis has reached the point where it is difficult to obtain a political solution without some military solutions. However, regardless of the situation in the area, there is no substitute for a political solution to the Lebanese problem which will come through and as a result of a national consensus among the Lebanese. Said President al-Asad addressing Minister Butrus: "I ask you to tell President Sarkis and all the Lebanese factions of every kind that Syria does not cherish any hatred or resentment of any of them. It wants to try to bring about harmony and well-being among the Lebanese." These frank and pointed remarks of President al-Asad were not only the Syrian president's answer to the letter that Minister Butrus brought him from President Jlyas Sarkis. It was more far-reaching than that. It constitutes a specific and positive development in the intentions of the Syrian capital to use all its political influence to face some of the complicated problems from which Lebanon is suffering and try to solve them with all its power and determination. This is what led the government to voice great satisfaction with the results of these new talks with Damascus

and to see in them a change that encourages the government to expect (the following) Syrian initiatives to result from it:

(1) Support for implementation of the security decisions whether made by the Arab Follow-up Committee or inspired by the security plan prepared by the government, especially with regard to making Lebanese security forces legal along the lines of contact in Beirut.

(2) Expectation of a positive Syrian attitude with regard to opening a political dialogue with the Phalangist party in line with the idea that Minister Butrus brought from President Sarkis to President Assad, although Damascus still prefers that the dialogue begin between the Lebanese parties first. Minister 'Abd al-Halim Khaddam will undertake to study the matter and decide afterward whether to make a final decision on raising the level of dialogue with the Phalangists from the framework of the Arab Follow-up Committee to the political leaders' level.

(3) Assuring the Lebanese government that there is a decreasing possibility of a security explosion occurring that will bring back an atmosphere conducive to the renewal of fighting in Lebanon with the approach of April, as the government has feared. The promises Minister Butrus received in Damascus were not limited to the expenditure of effort to prevent a renewal of the fighting and preservation of the existing truce. They went beyond that to promises of working to bring about greater improvement in the security situation, especially along the lines of contact.

(4) Commitment of the Syrian capital to assuring a peaceful, calm, and stable atmosphere in which the Lebanese presidential election can take place at the constitutionally designated time. Minister Butrus also says that after President al-Asad received him, he issued instructions to all the Syrian information media to confirm Damascus' commitment to launching a series of new initiatives to stabilize the security situation in Lebanon and strive for national harmony. Based on previous experience, the Lebanese government considers that these instructions confirm that Damascus has decided to put its weight and influence behind the launching of security and political initiatives in Lebanon. This belief was confirmed after Damascus decided to invite the leaders of the National Movement to consult with them on security and political matters in Lebanon and ask them to help implement the decisions made in this regard.

But the question now before us is whether the security and political measures we would like to be taken guarantee that the situation will develop in the area as Minister 'Abd al-Halim Khaddam indicated. Or are such initiatives, as Minister Butrus says, small decisions whose purpose is to bring about security relaxation but not large enough in scope to justify our hopes and expectations?

'UTHMAN MUSTAFA DISCUSSES ECONOMY, RELATIONS WITH LIBYA, CHAD

Jiddah 'UKAZ in Arabic 17 Apr 82 p 8

[Interview with 'Uthman Mustafa by 'UKAZ; date and place not specified]

[Excerpts] [Answer] In the Sudan we have about 40 volunteers working in different fields. We have tried to take great advantage of the services provided by these volunteers. We shall try to take advantage of these volunteer's potential in various developmental areas. They will be useful in rectifying any shortcomings we might discover in a particular area.

The True Economic Situation

[Question] Some have observed that the development process in the Sudan has been faced with "setbacks" in its schedule due to large debts which the Sudan has not been able to repay. What is the true economic situation of the Sudan at present? Can these debts be attended to without fulfilling your developmental schemes?

[Answer] Like all underdeveloped countries, the Sudan is trying to obtain the comforts of life for all of its Muslim Sudanese people. The process of developmental planning began in the early sixties, when we began implementing the 10-year plans. Despite the difficulties confronting the 3-year plan, nevertheless the 5-year plan realized some important achievements, such as the Abu Jinis reservoir, the mines-expansion project, and others.

We began implementing the 5-year plan at the beginning of the May 1979 Revolution. This plan was modified to become the 7-year plan, followed by the 6-year plan which will end in the fiscal year 1982-83. In the course of these programs it was possible to implement several developmental projects in the country, such as the Rahd project with an area of about 100,000 feddans reserved for growing cotton, beans, and other agricultural products, not to mention other projects in the industrial sphere.

The Debt Problem Doesn't Worry Us

As far as Sudanese debts are concerned, the problem of repayment is the same for us as it is with any other underdeveloped country in need of resources; hence, our insistence on development and raising the standard

of living of our people. At the same time we have had a drop in production of our developmental projects. This is due to the fact that we have undertaken projects which required extraordinary amounts of money to finance, and we are still at the deficit stage where what is exported is less than imports. This affects our payments. The two commodities that are most exhausting our resources are petroleum and sugar. The Sudan spends about 1 million Sudanese pounds per day on oil in order to meet the country's average annual needs of 400 million Sudanese pounds. This amount alone is equal in value to all of the Sudan's exports combined. Sugar also consumes about the same amount, because local production cannot meet our needs.

I would like to point out that the matter of the Sudan's debts is not a source of worry. We are currently giving serious thought to making the most of our petroleum resources.

Sudan is Stable and the People are Happy

[Question] How would you describe the domestic situation in the Sudan in light of these problems with which you are confronted?

[Answer] The Sudan is stable politically, economically, and socially. The Sudanese people are very happy with the state of affairs they find themselves in, despite all the difficulties. We consider them temporary difficulties. This is inevitable, due primarily to a problem with saving enough money with which to meet our basic needs.

The Libyan Regime's Actions

[Question] This leads us to ask about the disturbances recently which led to the closing of Khartoum University. Are there economic motives behind these disturbances, or do you blame another influence being behind the events and demonstrations in the Sudan?

[Answer] As I said, like all underdeveloped nations the Sudan is trying to achieve a comfortable standard of living for all sectors of the population. The process of developmental planning began in the early sixties. And every Sudanese person knows very well that the only party trying to stir up trouble is Libya, because the Sudan has no problems with any other nation. The Libyan regime is the only one that encourages terrorist acts against the people of the Sudan and the destruction of all of its economic achievements. Libya is opposed to everything that has brought peace and security to the Sudanese people. Libya undertakes these actions without any thought to the kind of relations that should exist between neighbors, or to the brotherly bonds that tie the Sudanese to the Libyan Arab people. Nor does Libya have any regard for the principles which govern human conduct, or for the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of a sovereign nation, i.e., the Democratic Republic of the Sudan.

And unfortunately, the Libyan regime does not confine these practices only to its neighbors, but is now carrying them to other nations. And although these nations might be rid of the terrorist gangs financed by Colonel Qadhdhafi, they cannot be free from his tongue.

Generally speaking, I would like to make clear that all of the past troublesome events in the Sudan were instigated by the Qadhdhafi regime.

Relations With Chad

[Question] Certainly neighborly relations are a prerequisite for allowing the Sudan to undertake its developmental plans in a climate conducive to optimal use of its economic resources. This leads us to ask about relations between the Sudan and Chad, particularly after the Libyan withdrawal from Chad?

[Answer] Relations are improving steadily with Chad. This is due to the role played by the Sudan in ensuring stability in Chad.

[Question] Does this mean the Sudan withdrew its support from Husayn Jabri's forces?

[Answer] When the Sudan extended its efforts to ensure stability in Chad, it was not supporting any force in particular. We only want stability to reign in Chad, not chaos.

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